• "Legal Barriers to Information Sharing: The Erection of a Wall Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Investigationst Organizations in the Twenty-First Century", August 2004. An August 2004 monograph titled "Legal Barriers to Information Sharing: The Erection of a Wall Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement Investigations", which was authored by the 9/11 Commission staff, was declassified in June 2009. As the introduction of the monograph explains, "As the threat of terrorism from radical Islamic groups developed, the FBI had both law enforcement and intelligence responsibilities in response to the threat. And it had different tools to use depending on whether its investigation was designated as an intelligence matter Of a criminal matter. For criminal matters it could apply for and use traditional criminal warrants. For intelligence matters it could apply to a special court, known as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), for warrants pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978. This law governs electronic surveillance and physical searches of foreign powers and their agents within the United States. This divergence in purposes for the respective types of investigations and concerns about using intelligence techniques to advance law enforcement interests led to information sharing barriers being erected between the investigations. This paper will describe the history and development of the various barriers and their impact on the 9/11 story."

•  "Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty-First Century", October 2007. As the author explains, "this monograph focuses on the ways the U.S. Government can effectively fight terrorist organizations beyond simply trying to deny terrorist access to financing. Specifically, the U.S. Government can use financial information as the 'string' that leads to all aspects of terrorist operations. By disrupting access to financial resources and, more importantly, following its trail, the U.S. Government through coordinated intelligence, investigations, prosecutions, sanctions, and diplomacy within the Interagency, private sector, allies, and partner nations, can enhance U.S. security, disrupt terrorist operations and mitigate terrorist effects on U.S. strategic interests."

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA):

• “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003)”, May 2004, August 24, 2009. The much anticipated CIA Inspector General’s report, titled “Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001-October 2003)”, has been released. The treatment of USS Cole conspirator 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri has come under particular scrutiny: “The debriefer used an unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri into disclosing information....Nashiri sat shackled and [he] racked the handgun once or twice close to Al-Nashiri's head. On what was probably the same day, the debriefer used the power drill to frighten Al-Nashiri. With [redacted] consent, the debriefer entered the detainee's cell and revved the drill while the detainee stood naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the power drill.”

• "Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program", July 10, 2009. The Inspector Generals of the CIA, NSA, DOJ, DOD, and ODNI released an "Unclassified Report on the President's Surveillance Program" (PSP), which noted the "the conflicting views surrounding the legality of aspects of the PSP during 2004, [and] the confrontation between officials from DOJ and the White House about the legal basis for parts of the program,." The report also stated that "Many senior IC officials believe that the PSP filled a gap in intelligence collection thought to exist under the FISA statute shortly after the al-Qa'ida terrorist attacks against the United States. Others within the IC, including FBI agents, CIA analysts and officers, and other officials had difficulty evaluating the precise contribution of the PSP to counterterrorism efforts because it was most often viewed as one source among many available analytic and intelligence-gathering tools in these efforts."

• "CIA Accountability with Respect to the 9/11 Attacks" - Executive Summary and Statement by CIA Director Michael Hayden, June 2005; Released August 2007. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) team concluded that "the Agency and its officers did not discharge their responsibilities in a satisfactory manner." Further, "the findings of greatest concern are those that identify systematic problems where the Agency's programs or processes did not work as they should have, and concerning which a number of persons were involved or aware, or should have been."
  

• "National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism", February 2006. This Department of Defense document asserts that "it is of supreme importance that the United States Military understand the nature of the threat and the nature of this war. This understanding is critical to the implementation of this strategy. Integral to the National Military Strategic Plan for the GWOT is the concept of 'supporting mainstream efforts to reject violent extremism.' All military members need an understanding of this critical element of the strategy. We must be aware of the culture, customs, language and philosophy of affected populations and the enemy, to more effectively counter extremism, and encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity abroad."
  

• "Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India and Implications for U.S. Interests", December 2008. This CRS report notes that "The Mumbai attacks have brought even more intense international attention to the increasingly deadly and destabilizing incidence of Islamist extremism in South Asia, and they may affect the course of U.S. policy toward Pakistan, especially. The episode also has major domestic implications for India, in both the political and security realms. Indian counterterrorism capabilities have come under intense scrutiny, and the United States may further expand bilateral cooperation with and assistance to India in this realm."
  

• "Islamic Finance: Overview and Policy Concerns", July 2008. This CRS report states that "the international market for Islamic finance has grown between 10% to 15% annually in recent years. Islamic finance historically has been concentrated in the Persian Gulf countries, but has expanded globally to both Muslim and non-Muslim countries. There is a small but growing market for Islamic finance in the United States...Critics of Islamic finance express concerns about possible ties between Islamic finance and political agendas or terrorist financing and the use of Islamic finance to circumvent U.S. economic sanctions. Proponents argue that Islamic finance presents significant new business opportunities and provides alternate methods for capital formation and economic development."

• "Terrorism and Security Issues Facing the Water Infrastructure Sector", Updated July 2008. This report notes that "damage to or destruction of the nation’s water supply and water quality infrastructure by terrorist attack or natural disaster could disrupt the delivery of vital human services in this country, threatening public health and the environment, or possibly causing loss of life."
  

• "North Korea: Terrorist List Removal?", December 2007. This report notes that "according to reputable sources", "North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah..."

• "Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress", July 2007. This report "includes over 30 options for congressional consideration to clarify and potentially enhance the federal government’s relationship with fusion centers."
  

• "Agroterrorism: Threats and Preparedness", Updated March 2007. This report is based on the premise that "the potential for terrorist attacks against agricultural targets (agroterrorism) is increasingly recognized as a national security threat, especially after the events of September 11, 2001."
  

• "The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11", Updated March 2007. The Congressional Research Service estimates that "total funding for Iraq and the GWOT could reach from about $980 billion to $1.4 trillion by 2017."
  

• "Combating Terrorism: The Challenge of Measuring Effectiveness", Updated March 2007. According to the Congressional Research Service, "this report is designed to support efforts of the 110th Congress to understand and apply broad based objective criteria when evaluating progress in the nation’s efforts to combat terrorism."
  

• "International Terrorism: Threat, Policy, and Response", Updated January 2007. This Congressional Research Service report "examines international terrorist actions, threats, U.S. policies and responses. It reviews the nation’s use of tools at its disposal to combat terrorism, from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to physical security enhancement, economic sanctions, covert action, and military force."
  

• "Bioterrorism Countermeasure Development: Issues in Patents and Homeland Security", Updated November 2006. Congressional Research Service analysts addressed bills pertaining to bioterrorism countermeasures that were considered, but not enacted by the 109th Congress, that "proposed reforms to current policies and practices associated with intellectual property, particularly patents, and the marketing of pharmaceuticals and related products."
  

• "Treatment of 'Battlefield Detainees' in the War on Terrorism", Updated November 2006. This Congressional Research Service report "provides an overview of the law of war and the historical treatment of wartime detainees, in particular the U.S. practice; describes how the detainees’ status might affect their rights and treatment; and summarizes activity of the 108th and 109th Congresses related to detention in connection with the war against terrorism."

• "U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism", Updated October 2006. This report asserts that "a salient issue for Congress will be whether the U.S.-EU agreements on extradition and mutual legal assistance add value to the existing bilateral accords on these issues that Washington already has with most EU member states."
  

• "Trends in Terrorism", July 2006. The author of this document argues that "emerging trends that may require enhanced policy focus are (1) attacks that aim to cause economic damage such as attacks on transportation infrastructure, tourism, and oil installations, (2) the growing  number of unattributed terrorist attacks, and (3) the growing power and influence of radical Islamist political parties in foreign nations."
  

• "Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends", Updated March 2006. This Congressional Research Service brief "examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response."
  

• "Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles", Updated February 2006. The Congressional Research Service assesses the possible options when addressing the threat posed by shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles (SAMs; a.k.a. MANPADS). 
  

• "Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment", August 2005. This paper "focus[es] on the Al Qaeda organization and its major affiliates, but not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist."
  

• "Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology", June 2005. This Congressional Research Service "report reviews Al Qaeda’s use of public statements from the mid-1990s to the present and analyzes the evolving ideological and political content of those statements. The report focuses primarily on statements made by Osama Bin Laden..."
  

• "The National Counterterrorism Center: Implementation Challenges and Issues for Congress", March 2005. This Congressional Research Service report seeks "to outline the commonalities and potential differences between EO 13354 and P.L. 108-458, as these conceptual differences could be meaningful in the implementation process of P.L. 108-458 and/or should the issue of intelligence reform be re-visited by the 109th Congress."
  

• "Islam: Sunnis and Shiites", February 2004. The Congressional Research Service offers "a historical background of the Sunni-Shiite split and the differences in religious beliefs and practices between and within each Islamic sect as well as their similarities."
  

• "Terrorists and Suicide Attacks", August 2003. This document "focuses on the following questions: What are suicide attacks? What have been the patterns and motivations for terrorist organizations using suicide attacks in the past? What terrorist groups and other organizations are most likely to launch such attacks? How great a threat are terrorist suicide attacks to the United States, at home and abroad? How can the United States counter such a threat? It analyzes the key lessons of the international experience with suicide attacks and examines their relevance to the United States."
  

• "Foreign Terrorists and the Availability of Firearms and Black Powder in the United States", May 2003. The Congressional Research Service answered 28 questions Senator Frank Lautenberg "asked regarding the possible acquisition of firearms and black powder by foreign terrorists in the United States."
  

• "Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy", April 2003. The author of this document notes that "this issue brief examines international terrorist actions and threats and the U.S. policy response. Available policy options range from diplomacy, international cooperation, and constructive engagement to economic sanctions, covert action, physical security enhancement, and military force."
  

• "Islam: A Primer", February 2003. The Congressional Research Service provides "short descriptions of the historical background, the tenets of Islam, jihad, the status of women in Islam, and other aspects of Islam."
  

• "Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002", Updated February 2002. This document analyzes "Near Eastern terrorist groups and countries on the U.S. 'terrorism list,'..."
  

• "Securing the Global Supply Chain: Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) Strategic Plan", February 2006. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) explains that its "priority mission is to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States." Further, "In protecting our borders against the threat of terrorism and promoting global supply chain security, CBP applies a 'layered defense' strategy. This multi-layered approach includes using information analysis and targeting, employing advanced inspection technologies, engaging the private sector to increase supply chain security and expanding our borders by pre-screening shipments that pose a potential terrorist risk prior to arrival in the United States."
  

• "Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency", June 2008. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Science International Applications Corporation released a report titled, "Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency." As the authors explain, "The hypotheses analyzed in this report can be divided roughly into two broad categories. The first category – Capabilities – suggests that terrorists have been unable to succeed in conducting another large-scale attack on the homeland due to the effectiveness of U.S. defenses or because of the terrorists’ limited capabilities. The second category – Motivations – assumes that a number of terrorist groups possess the ability to attack the United States but have chosen not to do so for a variety of reasons." There are more than two dozen competing explanations and "this study suggests that identifying a complete and consistent explanation for the non-occurrence of a subsequent attack on the U.S. homeland may not be possible."
  

• "Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends", May 2009. The Department of Defense released a fact sheet, titled "Former Guantanamo Detainee Terrorism Trends," which states that, "Based on a comprehensive review of available information as of mid-March 2009, the Defense Intelligence Agency reported 14 percent as the overall rate of former Guantanamo detainees confirmed or suspected of reengaging in terrorist activities. Of the more than 530 Guantanamo detainees transferred from Department of Defense custody to Guantanamo Bay, 27 were confirmed and 47 were suspected of reengaging in terrorist activity. Between December 2008 and March 2009, nine detainees were added to the confirmed list, six of whom were previously on the suspected list." Further, "Various former Guantanamo detainees are known to have reengaged in terrorist activity associated with the al- Qaeda network, and have been arrested for reengaging in terrorist activities including facilitating the travel of terrorist into war zones, providing funds to al-Qaida, and supporting and associating with known terrorists."
  

• "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan", March 2009. The "White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan" noted that "the core goal of the U.S. must be to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan." The paper acknowledges that achieving this goal "require[s] a new way of thinking about the challenges, a wide ranging diplomatic strategy to build support for our efforts, enhanced engagement with the publics in the region and at home, and a realization that all elements of international power — diplomatic, informational, military and economic — must be brought to bear. They will also require a significant change in the management, resources, and focus of our foreign assistance."

• "al Qaida-Like Mobile Discussions & Potential Creative Uses", October 2008. A draft of a For Official Use Only Supplemental to the Army’s 304th Military Intelligence Battalion Bulletin titled “al Qaida-Like Mobile Discussions & Potential Creative Uses” has become public. The document features sections titled "Pro Terrorist Propaganda Cell Phone Interface," "Mobile Phone Surveillance," "Voice Changers for Terrorist Telephone Calls?", as well as one titled "Potential for Terrorist Use of Twitter: A Red Teaming Perspective."
  

• "U.S. Central Command Red Team Report", August 2008. A U.S. Central Command Red Team report titled "Freedom of Speech in Jihad Analysis: Debunking the Myth of Offensive Words" has become public. Challenging a recent DHS report, which cautioned against using terms such as, 'jihadist,' 'Islamic terrorist,' 'Islamist,' and 'holy warrior', the report asserts that "we must reject the notion that Islam and Arabic stand apart as bodies of knowledge that cannot be critiqued or discussed as elements of understanding our enemies in this conflict." It adds, "The fact is our enemies cite the source of Islam as the foundation for their global jihad...We are left with the responsibility of portraying our enemies in an honest and accurate fashion."   
  

• "National Defense Strategy - 2008", June 2008. The Department of Defense released the "National Defense Strategy" (NDS), which "outlines the national approach to the defense of" the U.S. and its interests. As DOD explains, "The NDS is issued periodically and the last one was published in March 2005. It outlines how the Department supports the President’s National Security Strategy and informs the National Military Strategy and other subordinate strategy documents. The strategy builds on lessons learned and insights from previous operations and strategic reviews such as the 2006 QDR."

• "Senior Al-Qaida Terrorists Recently Killed or Captured", April 2008. The Department of Defense has released a graphic depicting the senior Al-Qaida terrorists recently killed or captured in Iraq.
  

• "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq", March 2008. In a March 2008 report to Congress titled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq," the Department of Defense states that "terrorists and foreign fighters continue to find safe haven, border transit opportunities and logistical support in Syria, despite increasing Syrian counterterrorism efforts. Estimates suggest that Syria is the entry point for 90% of all known foreign terrorists in Iraq. Former Iraqi regime elements opposed to the GoI also find sanctuary in Syria." Further, "it is not clear that Syria has
  made a strategic decision to deal with foreign terrorists using Syria as a transit point into Iraq."
  

• "Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007", March 2008. This report, authored by the Defense Personnel Security Research Center, "documents changes and trends in American espionage since 1990...Findings include: since 1990 offenders are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties. Their espionage is more likely to be motivated by divided loyalties." Interestingly, "since 1990, money has not been the primary motivation for espionage."
  

• "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 1 (Redacted)", March 2008. Researchers from the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Department of Defense entity, "screened more than 600,000 original captured documents and several thousand hours of audio and video footage archived in a US Department of Defense (DOD) database called Harmony" in order to "report on the inner workings...of the Saddam Hussein regime." The review "uncovered strong evidence that links the regime of Saddam Hussein to regional and global terrorism. Despite their incompatible long-term goals, many terrorist movements and Saddam found a common enemy in the United States." However, "this study found 'no smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda. Saddam's interest in, and support for, non-state actors was spread across a variety of revolutionary, liberation, nationalist, and Islamic terrorist organizations. Some in the regime recognized the potential high internal and external costs of maintaining relatiosnhips with radical Islamic groups, yet they concluded that in some cases, the benefits of association outweighed the risks."
  

• "Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 2 (Redacted)", March 2008. These documents serve as the source material for a report published by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses. 
  

• "Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 3 (Redacted)", March 2008. These documents serve as the source material for a report published by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
  

• "Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 4 (Redacted)", March 2008. These documents serve as the source material for a report published by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
  

• "Primary Source Materials for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents, Volume 5 (Redacted)", March 2008. These documents serve as the source material for a report published by the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP) at the Institute for Defense Analyses.
  
  
• "Al-Qaida Recruits Children, Women for Terror Missions", and Pictures of Children, February 2008. The Armed Forces Press Service reported that "five training tapes recovered in a December raid show as many as 20 boys, most thought to be younger than 11 years old, carrying automatic weapons and grenades, storming homes in mock kidnappings and assassinations, and sitting in a circle chanting their allegiance to al Qaeda."
  

• "Al-Qaida in Iraq: January 2008 Update", January 2008. This Department of Defense briefing provides an update on the status of Al-Qaida in Iraq.
  

• "Ex-Guantanamo Detainees Who Have Returned to the Fight", July 2007.  In a July 2007 report, the Department of Defense revealed "that at least 30 former GTMO detainees have taken part in anti-coalition militant activities after leaving U.S. detention." According to DOD, "these former detainees successfully lied to US officials, sometimes for over three years. Many detainees later identified as having returned to fight against the U.S. with terrorists falsely claimed to be farmers, truck drivers, cooks, small-scale merchants, or low-level combatants." In April 2008, Abdallah Salih al-Ajmi, a Kuwaiti who had been detained at Guantanamo Bay for over three years, reportedly carried out a suicide bombing in Mosul, Iraq. In January 2009, in a an Al-Qaida in Yemen video, Mohamed Atiq Awayd al-Harbi appeared beside Sa'id Ali Jabir Al Khathim Al Shihri, identified as deputy leader of the group. Both al-Harbi and Al Shihri were released from GITMO in 2007 and participated in a reeducation program in Saudi Arabia. That same month the Pentagon asserted that 61 former GITMO detainees have returned to terrorism since being released.
  

• "Southern Afghanistan COIN Operations", October 2006. A For Official Use Only handbook authored by the U.S. Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) titled "Southern Afghanistan COIN Operations" has become public. According to the document's forward, "Originally written as an information paper by members of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Operations Forces Group Alpha...CALL Handbook 07-6 provides a strategy for conducting counterinsurgency in southern Afghanistan." The introduction adds, "This handbook provides guidance to the commanders and staffs of combined-arms forces that have a primary mission of eliminating insurgent forces and discusses the nature of organized guerrilla units and underground elements and their supporters. This handbook provides information on organization; training; and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) combined-arms forces, in conjunction with civil agencies, can employ to destroy large, well-organized insurgent forces in active counterinsurgency (COIN) conflicts. The focal point is the COIN fight in southern Afghanistan. Many of the examples in this handbook are derived from actual experiences of a United States Special Forces task force during its four deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom."
  

• "National Infrastructure Protection Plan: 2009", February 2009. The Department of Homeland Security's National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) has been released. According to DHS, "The NIPP provides the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future CIKR [critical infrastructure and key resource] protection efforts and resiliency strategies into a single national program to achieve this goal. The NIPP framework supports the prioritization of protection and resiliency initiatives and investments across sectors to ensure that government and private sector resources are applied where they offer the most benefit for mitigating risk by lessening vulnerabilities, deterring threats, and minimizing the consequences of terrorist attacks and other manmade and natural disasters."  

• "Foreign Travel Threat Assessment: Electronic Communications Vulnerabilities", June 2008. In a June 2008 Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Foreign Travel Threat Assessment: Electronic Communications Vulnerabilities" that has been leaked to the public, the Department of Homeland Security writes, "Foreign governments routinely target the computers and other electronic devices and media carried by U.S. corporate and government personnel traveling abroad to gather economic, military, and political information. Theft of sensitive information can occur in a foreign country at any point between a traveler’s arrival and departure and can continue after returning home without the victim being aware."
  

• "Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims", January 2008. In a leaked January 2008 For Official Use Only memo, which has become the subject of considerable controversy, the Department of Homeland Security's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties argues that "words matter" and thus "terminology should...be strategic" to "avoid helping the terrorists by inflating the religious bases and glamorous appeal of their ideology." The memorandum "outlines recommendations from a wide variety of American Muslim leaders regarding the difficult terrain of terminology." For example, "the experts counseled caution in using terms such as, 'jihadist,' 'Islamic terrorist,' 'Islamist,' and 'holy warrior' as grandiose descriptions."
  

• "Potential Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Information Infrastructure", June 2007. In a June 2007, Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Potential Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Information Infrastructure" that has been leaked to the public, the Department of Homeland Security writes that "DHS assess that Islamic terrorist groups such as al-Qa'ida, HAMAS, and Hizballah have a growing appreciation of information technology to support their operations, and could parlay their cyber knowledge into attacks on homeland information infrastructure." Further, "Islamic extremists have expressed interest in developing the capability to exploit cyber vulnerabilities to disrupt the provision of services, exact economic costs, and undermine public confidence. DHS I&A lacks information on al-Qa'ida's ability to mount a cyber attack against U.S. infrastructure targets." Notably, "an al-Qa'ida operational planner in 2002 explored the possibility of hacking to  destabilize banking communications, infrastructures, and power. The development of a specific plan, however, has not been confirmed." 
  

• "Increasing Threat of Keyloggers to Computer Security", May 2007. This Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Homeland Security Assessment" has become public. It warns that "keyloggers and associated spyware have evolved into one of the most prevalent and potentially harmful threats to U.S. information infrastructure. Users of these intrusive software programs and hardware devices have targeted personally identifiable information, corporate intellectual property, government classified information, and critical infrastructure data repositories."
  

• "Strategic Sector Assessment: Commercial Facilities", January 2007. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment," produced by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), states that "DHS has specific and credible reporting from multiple sources indicating al-Qa‘ida’s historical interest in attacking specific elements of the CFS. DHS is not aware of any specific imminent threat to critical infrastructure in the sector, but an attack against a sector asset likely would meet al-Qa‘ida’s strategic targeting criteria, which are to inflict American casualties, cause psychological damage to the U.S. population by attacking symbols of U.S. culture or symbolic value, and damage the national economy."
  

• "Strategic Sector Assessment: Government Facilities", December 2006. Authored by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), this Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment" has become become public. According to the report, "DHS continues to receive information on terrorist threats to the government facilities sector (GFS); however, there is no recent information to suggest terrorist operational planning may be underway in the United States...an attack against government facilities would fit al-Qa‘ida’s targeting strategy of causing mass casualties, panic, and economic losses and would further the group’s strategic goals."
  

• "Fear of Terrorist Attack Could Trigger Mass Psychogenic Illness", July 2006. Authored by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), an Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Private Sector Note" titled "Fear of Terrorist Attack Could Trigger Mass Psychogenic Illness" has become become public. According to the report, "An outbreak of mass psychogenic illness in the Homeland related to terrorism or the threat of terrorism is possible, and should be taken into account when planning and executing incident response."

• "The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Commercial Passenger and Freight Rail System", May 2006. This "Strategic Sector Assessment" was produced by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC). According to the assessment, "the most likely targets considered by al-Qa‘ida or affiliated extremists are passenger trains loaded to capacity during peak ridership periods, underwater rail tunnels, and heavily used stations in large metropolitan areas. Within the United States, heavily used stations include Pennsylvania Station...and Grand Central Station in New York, and Union Station in Washington, D.C." Assessing the freight rail threat, the document states, "a terrorist attack against the freight rail system is possible, but less likely because it would require more complex planning and execution to achieve substantial casualties or economic damage."
  

• "Strategic Sector Assessment: U.S. Aviation", May 2006. This Unclassified/For Official Use Only "Strategic Sector Assessment" was distributed by DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat & Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) and has become been released with redactions. The report notes that "in the summer of 2003, al-Qa'ida planned to use camera flash attachments as stun guns. They also intended to use cameras to disguise bomb components in order to hijack commercial airliners and crash them into targets in Western countries, including along the U.S. East Coast and in Australia, Britain, and Italy." Further, "as of early July 2005, al-Qa'ida reportedly had planned to attack military and civilian airports in Los Angeles and San Diego in September or October of 2005. The possible tactics included the hijacking of an airliner on the way from India to the United States, or a flight from Mexico."
  

• "DHS Intelligence Enterprise Strategic Plan", January 2006. The plan's primary goal is to "ensure all Homeland Security intelligence-related information is gathered, collected, reported, and disseminated to those who need it." 
  

• "False Hospital Inspections", April 25, 2005. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin reveals that "over the past year, there have been several reported cases of personnel falsely representing themselves as Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). These said individuals were attempting to gain public health service information from hospital personnel, and behaved in a manner inconsistent with legitimate inspection professionals." DHS adds that "while these suspicious activities may exhibit characteristics of criminal activity or even possible pre-operational planning activity, DHS has no information indicating that they are tied to a specific and credible threat of an al-Qaida-associated terrorist attack against hospital facilities inside the United States."
  

• "How Terrorists Might Exploit a Hurricane", September 15, 2004. This now-public, Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security document was produced by the Analytic Red Cell Program, which brought together "more than 35 experts from intelligence, industry, military, and academia" and asked them "to speculate on possible terrorist exploitation of a high category hurricane." According to the report, "one opportunity would be for a group like al-Qaida to capitalize on the hurricane—and its strain on emergency response and security personnel—to launch a strike elsewhere in the region or country. Moreover, organized groups, splinter cells, or lone wolf terrorists might observe security measures to help planning for a future event, target evacuation routes and emergency shelters, or even impersonate emergency responders to attempt to gain access and cause destruction."
  

• "Remotely Piloted Vehicle Threat", June 7, 2004. This now-public, Unclassified/For Official Use Only, Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin states that "recent intelligence reporting confirms terrorist interest in the use of Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPV). RPVs fall into two categories; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), which are military hardware, or Remote Controlled Aircraft (RCAs), which are hobby model aircraft or commercial remote controlled aircraft. We have no specific information to indicate an imminent attack in the United States using such vehicles, but it is important to ensure that the above-named recipients are fully aware of these capabilities."

• "Maintaining Awareness Regarding Al Qaeda's Potential Threats to the Homeland", September 4, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security advisory warns that "a growing body of credible intelligence indicates Al-Qaeda continues to develop plans for multiple attacks against  targets in the US involving commercial aircraft, with some plans calling for hijacking airliners transiting near or flying over the continental United States - but not destined to land at US airports." The document also cautions about critical infrastructure threats, CBRN threats, and threats against soft targets.
  

• "Swimmer Attack Indicators and Protective Measures", August 22, 2003. According to this Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin, "although there is no evidence of international terrorist groups planning to utilize scuba divers to carry out attacks within the United States, there is a body of information showing the desire to obtain such capability. During the past two years there have been numerous incidents that have occurred involving suspicious individuals possibly conducting surveillance of port facilities, cruise ship docks, naval bases, dams, bridges and power facilities in the United States. Also, there has been law enforcement reporting of suspicious individuals having queried marine shops and schools concerning equipment and training."
  

• "Potential Terrorist Use of Official Identification, Uniforms, or Vehicles", July 22, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin states that "Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups likely view the theft or other illegal acquisition of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles as an effective way to increase access and decrease scrutiny in furtherance of planning and operations. Although we possess no information that Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups are systematically pursuing the illegal acquisition of the above referenced items, there is indeed precedence for the use of official identification, uniforms, or vehicles in the execution of terrorist attacks. Terrorist groups have utilized police or military uniforms to mask their identities and achieve closer access to their targets without arousing suspicion."

• "Potential Indicators of Threats Involving Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)", May 15, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Bulletin is "intended to provide general information to assist in efforts to recognize potential VBIED-related threats or incidents based on the recent Riyadh bombings."
• "Possible Indicators of Al-Qaeda Surveillance", March 20, 2003. This Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin states, "Al-Qaeda operations have been characterized by meticulous planning, a focus on inflicting mass casualties, and multiple, simultaneous suicide attacks...Recent information and analysis point to surveillance practices that traditionally have been utilized by Al-Qaeda-affliliated operatives." The Bulletin then lists a number of those indicators, such as "prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as panhandlers, demonstrators, shoe shiners, food or flower vendors, news agents, or street sweepers not previously seen in the area."
  

• "Potential Terrorist Use of Pressure Cookers". This Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin seeks "o alert frontline border inspectors and agents, state and local officers, and other first responders that there is continued interest by terrorist organizations to use innocuous items to package improvised explosive devices (IEDs.) A technique commonly taught in Afghan terrorist training camps is the use/conversion of pressure cookers into IEDs."

• "Residential Buildings". This Unclassified/For Office Use Only Risk Management Division document, which has become public, provides an overview of common vulnerabilities for residential buildings and suggests protective measures.
  
  
• "Religious Facilities". This Unclassified/For Office Use Only Risk Management Division document, which has become public, provides an overview of common vulnerabilities for religious facilities and suggests protective measures.
• "Casinos". This Unclassified/For Office Use Only Risk Management Division document, which has become public, provides an overview of common vulnerabilities for casinos and suggests protective measures.
• "Hotels". This Unclassified/For Office Use Only Risk Management Division document, which has become public, provides an overview of common vulnerabilities for hotels and suggests protective measures.

• "The Removal of a Canadian Citizen to Syria", March 2008. On September 26, 2002, Maher Arar - who held joint Canadian and Syrian citizenship -- flew into JFK Airport in Queens, New York from Tunisia (via Zurich). After being "identified as a special interest alience who was suspected of affiliations with a terrorist organization," he was removed from the U.S. on October 8, 2002. He was flown to Amman, Jordan and eventually taken into custody by Syria. "After Arar returned to Canada in October 2003, he alleged that he was beaten and tortured while in the custody of the Syrian government." This report examines DHS' conduct throughout the proceedings.
  

• "Review of Department's Handling of Suspicious Passengers Aboard Northwest Flight 327", March 2006. On June 29, 2004, "13 Middle Eastern men behaved in a suspicious manner that aroused the attention and concern of the flight attendants, passengers, air marshals, and pilots" aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 327 from Detroit to Los Angeles. The report examines the DHS investigation of the incident.
  

• "DHS Challenges in Consolidating Terrorist Watch List Information", August 2004. "The objectives of the review were to: (1) determine DHS’
  role in working with other federal agencies to consolidate terrorist watch list systems and operations in response to recent legislation and executive branch direction; (2) evaluate the effectiveness of plans and activities to standardize and consolidate the watch lists to address the new requirements; and (3) identify any obstacles or challenges encountered and determine whether changes to the interagency systems integration approach are needed."
  

• Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum for John A. Rizzo – Acting CIA General Counsel, August 2006, Declassified August 2009.  A previously TOP SECRET DOJ Office of Legal Counsel memorandum for John Rizzo, then acting CIA General Counsel, has been declassified and reveals that “several al Qaeda terrorists held at the maximum security prison at Florence, Colorado” organized a “coordinated hunger strike”, even though they were kept in physical isolation. The letter noted that “According to Bureau of Prison officials, the al Qaeda terrorists orchestrated the beginning of their hunger strike and developed a sophisticated method to resist compulusory feeding. Ultimately, due to this coordination, the al Qaeda terrorists succeeded in gaining transfer from high security detention. Al Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba similiary staged a coordinated riot in recent weeks that resulted in significant property damage and injury to some of the guards dispatched to put the uprising down. Through communication and planning among detainees, more than 75 al Qaeda detainees staged a coordinated hunger strike…”
  
  
• "Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the U.S. Criminal Justice System", June 2009. This fact sheet provides an overview of terror prosecutions in the Southern District of New York, terror prosecutions nationwide, and terror inmates in federal prisons. According to DOJ, "There are currently 216 inmates in Bureau of Prisons (BOP) custody who have a history of/or nexus to international terrorism."
  
  
• "Declassified Narrative Describing the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel's Opinions on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program", April 2009. This narrative, declassified at the behest of Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Jay D. Rockefeller, "is an effort to provide to the public an initial narrative of the history of the opinions of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), from 2002 to 2007, on the legality of the Central Intelligence Agency’s detention and interrogation program."
  
  
• "Navigating Your Agency’s Path to Intelligence-Led Policing", February 2009. This document "serves as an overview for implementing the ILP [Intelligence-Led Policing] framework within a law enforcement agency. The ILP approach is a process for enhancing law enforcement agency effectiveness. It also provides an organizational approach to gather and use many sources of information and intelligence to make timely and targeted strategic, operational, and tactical decisions, thereby enhancing law enforcement effectiveness. This document provides information on how the ILP framework can support existing law enforcement policing strategies."  
  
  
• "Counterterrorism White Paper" , June 2006. This white paper provides a useful summary of post-9/11 terrorism-linked prosecutions in the U.S.

• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Language Translation Program", October 2009. In an audit of the FBI’s foreign language translation program, the DOJ’s Inspector General revealed that “the FBI stated that it was not able to review all high-priority material requiring translation due in part to limited linguistic resources proficiency in certain languages.” Specifically, “for counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations between FYs 2003 and 2008 and for criminal investigations between FYs 2005 and 2008, we found that the FBI did not review 1.2 million hours (25 percent) of the 4.8 million audio hours it collected. Of this unreviewed material, 1 percent of the total unreviewed audio and text material and 72 percent of the unreviewed electronic files was material entirely in English. Significant portions of the FBI’s unreviewed audio material were collected for cases in its two highest-priority counterterrorism and counterintelligence categories…in FY 2008…the FBI did not review 740 counterterrorism audio hours collected in English for its highest-priority translation category. Additionally, the FBI did not review 2,800 counterterrorism audio hours (including 300 English-only hours)…for cases in its second highest-priority category.”
  
  
• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Practices", May 2009. The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General initiated an audit to: "(1) determine whether subjects of FBI terrorism investigations are appropriately and timely watchlisted and if these records are updated with new identifying information as required; (2) determine whether subjects of closed FBI terrorism investigations are removed from the consolidated terrorist watchlist in a timely manner when appropriate; and (3) examine the FBI’s watchlist nomination practices for individuals that were not associated with current terrorism case designations." The report found that "the FBI failed to nominate many subjects in the terrorism investigations that we sampled, did not nominate many others in a timely fashion, and did not update or remove watchlist records as required. Specifically, in 32 of the 216 (15 percent) terrorism investigations we reviewed, 35 subjects of these investigations were not nominated to the consolidated terrorist watchlist, contrary to FBI policy." The report also determined that "78 percent of the initial watchlist nominations we reviewed were not processed in established FBI timeframes."
  

• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Threat and Suspicious Incident Tracking System", November 2008. The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General initiated an audit “to evaluate the policies and procedures the FBI uses to identify, assess, and track terrorist threats and suspicious incidents.” The report “found that Guardian [Threat Tracking System] represents a significant improvement over how the FBI tracked and handled threat information in the past because it provides users with the ability to enter suspicious activity and threat information and manage threat assessments through an automated electronic workflow process.” Nonetheless, “important aspects of Guardian that need improvement” were also identified.

• "A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq", May 2008. The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General probed "whether FBI agents witnessed incidents of detainee abuse" in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq, "whether FBI employees reported any such abuse to their superiors or others, and how those reports were handled." The "review determined that the vast majority of FBI agents complied with FBI interview policies and separated themselves from interrogators who use non-FBI techniques."
  

• "Audit of the U.S. Department of Justice Terrorist Watchlist Nomination Processes", March 2008. Examining the Department of Justice (DOJ) terrorist watchlist nomination process, the DOJ Inspector General determined that the "the FBI was not always providing updated nominations when new information became known about a nominated individual." The IG "also found that the FBI was not always removing records from the watchlist when it was appropriate to do so." Further, the IG was "informed that FBI field offices had, at times, bypassed FBI headquarters and submitted nominations directly to NCTC. This could result in the watchlisting of individuals without an FBI quality review and could also affect the completeness of the FBI’s records that are maintained to support its watchlist nominations."

• "A Review of the FBI's Use of National Security Letters", March 2008. Reviewing the FBI's use of National Security Letters, the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General [OIG] determined that "the FBI and the Department [of Justice] have evidenced a commitment to correcting the problems we found in our first NSL [National Security Letter] report and have made signficant progress in addressing the need to improve compliance..." Nonetheless, errors were found; for example, when examining "in detail the FBI's field review," the OIG "determined that it did not capture all NSL-related possible intelligence violations in the files it reviewed...."
  

• "Follow-Up Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center", September 2007. This audit concluded that the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) "has enhanced its efforts to ensure the quality of watchlist data, has increased staff assigned to data quality management, and has developed a process and a separate office to address complaints filed by persons seeking relief from adverse effects related to terrorist watchlist screening. However, we also determined that the TSC’s management of the watchlist continues to have weaknesses."
  

• "Follow-Up Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts", April 2007. A follow-up audit by the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General determined "that the FBI has made progress in improving the hiring, training, utilization, and retention of intelligence analysts, although in some areas the progress has been slow and uneven."
  

• "The Department of Justice's Internal Controls over Terrorism Reporting", February 2007. This report asserts that the FBI, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and the Criminal Division "did not accurately report 24 of the 26" terrorism-related statistics reviewed.
  

• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Protect the Nation's Seaports", March 2006. According to this report, although "the FBI has taken steps to enhance its capability to identify, prevent, and respond to terrorists attacks in the maritime domain," "the FBI needs to take additional steps to improve its capability to deal with the threat of maritime terrorism..."
  

• "The External Effects of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Reprioritization Efforts", September 2005. This Inspector General report argued that "the FBI has lessened its efforts to combat traditional crime even more than it had planned...our review identified specific crime areas, such as financial institution fraud and bank robberies, in which other law enforcement officials said the FBI’s reduced investigative activity has hurt their ability to address the crime problem in their area and has left an investigative gap."
  

• "Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Language Translation Program Follow-Up", July 2005. Although the FBI made progress in addressing the Inspector General's recommendations in a previous audit, the investigation concluded that "key deficiencies remain in the FBI’s foreign language translation program, including a continuing backlog of unreviewed material, some instances where high-priority material has not been reviewed within 24 hours in accord with FBI policy, and continued challenges in meeting linguist hiring goals and target staffing levels."
  

• "Review of the Terrorist Screening Center's Efforts to Support the Secure Flight Program", August 2005. This audit asserted that "the TSC is trying to plan for a program that has several major undefined parameters. Specifically, the TSC does not know when Secure Flight will start, the volume of inquiries expected and the resulting number of resources required to respond, the quality of data it will have to analyze, and the specific details of the phased-in approach for taking the program from 'pre-operational testing' in September 2005 to full operational capability in FY 2007."
  

• "Review of the Terrorist Screening Center", June 2005. The Inspector General "found various areas of TSC [Terrorist Screening Center] operations needing improvement" and made 40 recommendations.

• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Efforts to Hire, Train, and Retain Intelligence Analysts", May 2005. This report notes "that the FBI has made significant progress in hiring and training quality analysts, although significant issues remain."

• "Inspection of the FBI's Security Risk Assessment for Individuals Requesting Access to Biological Agents and Toxins", March 2005. This report concludes "that the FBI has instituted effective management controls that enabled it to identify and correct program vulnerabilities in a timely manner. The FBI set productivity goals for processing SRA [Security Risk Assessment] applications and was closely monitoring its progress toward meeting those goals."
  

• "A Review of the FBI's Actions in Connection with Allegations Raised by Contract Linguist Sibel Edmonds", January 2005. Sibel Edmonds worked as a contract linguist for the FBI and made a number of allegations about that program, including "about actions by a co-worker related to potential espionage." This report examines, among other topics, "the factual basis underlying Edmonds' allegations against the co-worker" and "the allegation that the FBI decided to stop using Edmonds as a linguist in retaliation for her allegations."
  

• "The Federal Bureau of Investigation's Foreign Language Program - Translation of Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence Foreign Language Material", July 2004. This probe was initiated "to assess the FBI’s ability to translate critical foreign language material and success at meeting linguist hiring goals and examine whether the FBI’s procedures ensure the appropriate prioritization of work, accurate and timely translations of pertinent information, and adequate pre- and post-hire security screening of linguists."
  

• "Analysis of the Response by the Federal Bureau of Prisons to Recommendations in the OIG's April 2004 Report on the Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers", July 2004. The Inspector General assessed that "in general, we believe the BOP is taking important steps to implement most of the OIG’s recommendations" pertaining to "the recruitment, selection, screening, and supervision of individuals who provide Islamic religious services to federal inmates."
  

• "A Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Selection of Muslim Religious Services Providers", April 2004. This audit "revealed deficiencies in how the BOP selects and supervises Muslim religious services providers."
  

• "Open Source Center Report on Bolivia's Islamic Community", May 2009. A DNI Open Source Center report examining Bolivia's Islamic community has become public. The report "is an overview of mosques, Islamic organizations, and religious leaders in Bolivia and their susceptibility to foreign Islamist influence."
  
  
• "Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence", February 2009. Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Committee, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair noted that "The primary threat from Europe-based extremists stems from al-Qa’ida and Sunni affiliates who return from training in Pakistan to conduct attacks in Europe or the United States. We have had limited visibility into European plotting, but we assess that al-Qa’ida is continuing to plan attacks in Europe and the West. Al-Qa’ida has used Europe as a launching point for external operations against the Homeland on several occasions since 9/11, and we believe that the group continues to view Europe as a viable launching point. Al-Qa’ida most recently targeted Denmark and the UK, and we assess these countries remain viable targets. Al-Qa’ida leaders have also prominently mentioned France, most likely in reprisal for the 2004 headscarf ban. The social, political, and economic integration of Western Europe’s 15 to 20 million Muslims is progressing slowly, creating opportunities for extremist propagandists and recruiters." He continued, "Increased security measures at home and abroad have caused al-Qa’ida to view the West, especially the United States, as a harder target than in the past, but we remain concerned about an influx of Western recruits into the tribal areas since mid-2006."
  

• "Remarks by Ted Gistaro - National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats", August 2008. Speaking at the Washington Institute, Ted Gistaro, National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats, stated, "In spite of successful U.S. and allied operations against al-Qaeda, especially the death of important al-Qaeda figures since December, the group has maintained or strengthened key elements of its capability to attack the United States in the past year. First, al-Qaeda has strengthened its safe haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by deepening its alliances with Pakistani militants and pushing many elements of Pakistani government authority from the area. It now has many of the operational and organizational advantages it once enjoyed across the border in Afghanistan, albeit on a smaller and less secure scale. Second, despite some significant losses, al-Qaeda has replenished its bench of skilled mid-level lieutenants capable of directing its global operations. These losses collectively represent the most serious blow to al-Qaeda's leadership since 2005. While it sometimes can take several months to replace these individuals, al-Qaeda has developed succession plans, can reshuffle leadership responsibilities, and promote younger commanders with years of battlefield experience to senior positions. The leaders' collocation in the FATA allows them to manage the organization collaboratively, helping facilitate the replacement of key figures."

• "Background Briefing on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement", April 2008. In September 2007, the Israeli Air Force destroyed a Syrian target, which the U.S. government has publicly asserted was a nuclear facility. According to this background briefing by senior U.S. intelligence officials, the reactor "was constructed by the Syrians in the eastern desert of Syria along the Euphrates River on the east side. The Syrians constructed this reactor for the production of plutonium with the assistance of the North Koreans." Moreover, "shortly after the attack, the Syrians began...a massive effort to destroy the ruined reactor building and to remove all potentially incriminating nuclear-related equipment and structures. Much of the work was done at night or was hidden by tarps in an attempt to conceal it from our overhead observation."

• "United States Intelligence Community: Information Sharing Strategy", February 2008. The document's introduction states, "the need to share information became an imperative to protect our Nation in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on our homeland. The Intelligence Community’s 'need-to-know' culture, a necessity during the Cold War, is now a handicap that threatens our ability to uncover, respond, and protect against
  terrorism and other asymmetric threats. Each intelligence agency has its own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together facts and suppositions that, in the aggregate, could provide warning of the intentions of our adversaries." Now, according to the document, the "need to know" has become a "responsibility to provide."

• "The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland", July 2007. The Director of National Intelligence assessed that "Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here."

• "The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America", October 2005. The strategy seeks to achieve the following vision: "A unified enterprise of innovative intelligence professionals whose common purpose in defending American lives and interests, and  advancing American values, draws strength from our democratic institutions, diversity, and intellectual and technological prowess."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 2000". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1998". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1997". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1996". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 1995". This document, produced by the Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security, "compiles incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. These incidents are summarized in regional geographic overviews."
  

• "Testimony of Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Assistant Director, Cyber Division, FBI, Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security", November 2009. Testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Steven R. Chabinsky, Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s Cyber Division, warned that, “the FBI is aware of and investigating individuals who are affiliated with or sympathetic to al Qaeda who have recognized and discussed the vulnerabilities of the U.S. infrastructure to cyber attack; who have demonstrated an interest in elevating their computer hacking skills; and who are seeking more sophisticated capabilities from outside of their close-knit circles. Should terrorists obtain such capabilities, they will be matched with destructive and deadly intent.”
  
  
• "Testimony of FBI Director Robert Mueller Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs", September 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Testimony, FBI Director Mueller noted that "Individuals who attend overseas madrassas or religious institutions located in terrorist safe havens, such as in the northern regions of Yemen and Pakistan, are at risk of being radicalized or recruited by terrorist organizations. The growing number of individuals in the United States with connections to these types of institutions also provides an indirect means for those inspired by extremist rhetoric—but who lack the necessary contacts to increase their participation in violent actions—to become more engaged."
  
  
• "Remarks of FBI Director Robert Mueller at the Council on Foreign Relations", February 2009. Speaking to the Council on Foreign Relations, FBI Director Robert Mueller provided a glimpse into FBI concerns about radicalization in the U.S: "Oftentimes, the communities from which we need the most help are those who trust us the least. But it is in these communities that we must re-double our efforts. One pattern in particular concerns us. Over the years since September 11th, we have learned of young men from communities in the United States, radicalized and recruited here to travel to countries such as Afghanistan or Iraq, Yemen or Somalia. They may be recruited to participate in the fighting, or, in the extreme case, to become suicide bombers. A man from Minneapolis became what we believe to be the first U.S. citizen to carry out a terrorist suicide bombing. The attack occurred last October in northern Somalia, but it appears that this individual was radicalized in his hometown in Minnesota. The prospect of young men, indoctrinated and radicalized within their own communities and induced to travel to Somalia to take up arms—and to kill themselves and perhaps many others—is a perversion of the immigrant story. The parents of many of these young men risked everything to come to America, to provide their children with a brighter, more stable future. For these parents to leave a war-torn country only to find that their children have been convinced to return to that way of life is indeed heartbreaking. And it raises the question of whether these young men will one day come home, and, if so, what they might undertake here."
  

• "Hijackers Timeline". The NEFA Foundation is posting a 298 page FBI document, originally marked SECRET that has since been declassified,  titled "Hijackers Timeline." The document provides biographical data on the hijackers, as well as an extremely detailed accounting of their whereabouts from the 1990s through 9/11.

• "Sniper Tactics and Effects on the US Homeland", February 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Sniper Tactics and Effects on the US Homeland" that has been leaked, the Federal Bureau of Investigation writes that "the FBI and ATF currently has no credible intelligence that terrorist organizations are using or plan to conduct sniper operations against targets within the Homeland." However, it notes that "sniping attacks have spread fear and apprehension across communities and required only minimal personnel, training, and expense." The report adds that "if terrorists have machine-shop or auto-body experience, modifications to a vehicle can be so
  subtle and well-disguised as to escape initial notice from investigative personnel."
  

• "December 2007 Al-Qai'da Plan to Target US Shopping Malls in Chicago, Illinois and Los Angeles, California". This FBI document reports that "as of August 2007, al-Qa’ida planned to strike US shopping malls in Chicago, Illinois and Los Angeles, California during the 2007 Christmas season. Al-Qa’ida hoped to disrupt the US economy and had been planning the attack for the past two years." However, "the veracity of the information is uncertain..."

• "End of Ramadan Security Awareness", October 2006. This FBI Intelligence Bulletin, issued by the Counterterrorism Division, notes that "violent Islamic extremist groups...may view the last 10 days of Ramadan, especially Laylatu al-Qadr (the Night of Power), as a particularly opportune time to strike at the Homeland." However, "the FBI possesses no specific credible intelligence indicating that terrorists are planning to target the United States during the last 10 days of Ramadan."
  

• "The FBI's Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001", April 2004. As the document's introduction explains: "During the past 31 months, the FBI has undergone a transformation in all areas of its operations. The transformation has involved both the institution of new functions and capacities as well as refinements of existing processes and programs to modernize our operations. This report provides an overview of that reform process." This report was produced for the 9/11 Commission. 
  

• Press Release re: Al-Qaida Interest in Targeting U.S. Railways, October 2002. The FBI issued a press release on its website, stating that "information from debriefings of al-Qa'ida detainees as of mid-October indicates that the group has considered directly targeting U.S. passenger trains, possibly using operatives who have a Western appearance." Moreover, "recently captured al-Qa'ida photographs of U.S. railroad engines, cars, and crossings heighten the intelligence community's concern of this threat."
  

• "Terrorism: 2000-2001". Unlike prior FBI "Terrorism" reports, this document "provides an overview of terrorist incidents and preventions taking place in the United States," and also "discusses FBI investigations overseas"; it "thus provides a more comprehensive picture of the totality of the FBI's response to international terrorism."
  

• "Terrorism in the United States: 1999". This unclassified annual FBI report summarizes terrorist activity in the U.S. in 1999.

• "Terrorism in the United States: 1998". This unclassified annual FBI report summarizes terrorist activity in the U.S. in 1998.

• "Terrorism in the United States: 1997". This unclassified annual FBI report summarizes terrorist activity in the U.S. in 1997.

• "Terrorism in the United States: 1996". This unclassified annual FBI report summarizes terrorist activity in the U.S. in 1996.

•  "Super Bowl XLIII", January 2009. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only Joint Threat Assessment that has become public, the Special Events Working Group evaluated security threats to the Super Bowl. The document states that authorities "have no identified, credible terrorist threats to Super Bowl XLIII and associated events or venues. The high-profile nature of the Super Bowl, however, could make it a desirable target for a violent organization or individual seeking to take advantage of the intense media coverage."
  

• "56th Presidential Inauguration", January 2009. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only Joint Threat Assessment that has been leaked to the public, the Special Events Working Group -- comprised of the FBI, DHS, NCTC, NGIA, NORTHCOM, and others -- evaluated security threats to the inauguration. The document notes that there were  "no credible reports indicating a threat to the inauguration from international terrorists. Al-Qa‘ida and its affiliates, however, remain a persistent threat to the United States and its interests worldwide. International terrorists view presidential transitions as periods of increased vulnerability, potentially increasing the threat level during the event."
  

• "Unconfirmed Report of Terrorists Plotting to Attack New York Transit Systems", November 2008. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Unconfirmed Report of Terrorists Plotting to Attack New York Transit System" that has been leaked to the media, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "The FBI has received a plausible but unsubstantiated report indicating that al-Qa’ida terrorists in late September may have discussed targeting transit systems in and around New York City. These discussions reportedly involved the use of suicide bombers or explosives placed on subway/passenger rail systems." The bulletin continues, "We have no specific details to confirm that this plot has developed beyond aspirational planning, but we are issuing this warning out of concern that such an attack could possibly be conducted during the forthcoming holiday season."
  

• "Female Suicide Bomber Threat", February 2008. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Female Suicide Bombers Threat" that has been leaked to the media, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "continued use of female suicide bombers—the most recent example being a 3 February 2008 attack at the main railway station in Colombo, Sri Lanka— indicates that terrorists judge this tactic as effective in increasing defenses and thwarting security measures." However, the report also notes that "DHS and the FBI have no specific, credible intelligence indicating that terrorist organizations intend to utilize female suicide bombers against targets in the Homeland."

• "Terrorist Use of Modified Footwear to Conceal Explosives Devices", October 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Terrorist Use of Modified Footwear to Conceal Explosive Devices" that has been leaked to the media, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation note that "a recent terrorist incident involving the international smuggling of electric blasting caps highlights the continuing use of modified footwear as a concealment method for explosive devices."
  

• "Lax Login and Password Practices Increase Potential for Security Breaches", October 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin titled "Lax Login and Password Practices Increase Potential for Security Breaches" that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "hackers amass computer login and password information from compromised computers around the world."
  

• "Al-Qa'ida Media Campaign, Ramadan Highlight Need for Increased Awareness", September 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "recent messages from al-Qa‘ida marked the anniversary of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and immediately precede the annual Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins this week...Al-Qa‘ida and other terrorist groups previously have not singled out Ramadan specifically as an occasion to launch attacks, but in conjunction with the propaganda videos, DHS and the FBI urge continued heightenedvigilance by U.S. authorities at all levels."
  

• "Glasgow Airport Illustrates Varied Terrorist Tactics to Attack Transportation Infrastructure", July 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "the 30 June 2007 car crash at the Glasgow International Airport in Scotland demonstrates the varied tactics terrorists have at their disposal to attack commercial aviation. The majority of previous aviation-related terrorist plots involved attempts to destroy aircraft and harm passengers, whereas others focused on other elements of aviation infrastructure such as jet fuel storage and passenger terminals. Such incidents emphasize the need to consider all aspects of commercial aviation as potential targets."
  

• "Improvised Explosive Initiators", July 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "government controls for safety and security instituted over the past several years are making the procurement of commercial or military initiation devices to detonate explosives more difficult. Incidents in the United States and abroad indicate that terrorists and other criminals are instead improvising initiators. These improvised initiators are easy to assemble and can be made from commonly available materials." Further, "law enforcement officials and Homeland security personnel should be aware of unconventional methods that terrorists could use to initiate explosives. Recognizing improvised detonators could be a key in preventing an attack."

• "Fraudulent Identification: Terrorist and Criminal Intent", March 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only Joint Homeland Security Assessment that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation point out that "terrorists and criminals seek fraudulent U.S. identification documents in an effort to enter and exit the country, use financial institutions, and create aliases to mask their true identities." According to the document, "terrorists and criminals use a number of methods to acquire fraudulent identification. Stolen blank or insider-derived original documents such as birth certificates are a means to create a fictitious identity or to legitimatize a person’s status in the United States. Identification documents and cards can be created with off-the-shelf computer software and printed on high-resolution printers; this technique makes visual detection more difficult for law enforcement and border security officers."
  

• "Terrorist Threats to the U.S. Homeland: Reporting Guide for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource Owners and Operators", January 7, 2005. This leaked Unclassified/For Official Use Only, DHS/FBI document seeks "to leverage the vast information resources of our critical infrastructure partners to assist in recognizing activities or conditions that may be indicative of terrorist activity." The guide identifies "common indicators and patterns that may be associated with terrorist threats to the nation’s critical infrastructure. This guide also encourages reporting of relevant indicators and patterns to law enforcement and homeland security officials."
  

• "Terrorist Chemical Device", Updated November 18, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin leaked to the media, DHS and the FBI write that "terrorists have designed chemical dispersal devices fabricated from commonly available materials which are designed to asphyxiate victims. The device, in its simplest form, produces hydrogen cyanide (HCN) gas; however, it can be modified to produce both HCN and cyanogen chloride (ClCN) gas. Little or no training is required to assemble and deploy such a device, due to its simplicity. This improvised chemical device...consists of a pierced container or canister, such as a large milk container or paint can. The holes would presumably allow the toxic gas to escape." This bulletin was spurred by the discovery that a Bahrain-based terrorist cell was planning to launch a cyanide gas attack on the New York City subway system. For more information, see the NEFA Foundation "Target: America" report "The New York City Subway Poison Gas Plot."
  

• "Potential Terrorist Exploitation of Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) Systems", September 23, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only Information Bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation note that "Al-Qaida and other terrorist groups have considered targeting heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems of large commercial buildings."
  

• "Compressed Gas Cylinders as Components of IEDs", September 10, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write that "recent intelligence reporting indicates terrorists may be interested in devices using compressed, flammable gas cylinders to destroy buildings. However, these devices will not produce pressure waves equivalent to those from an explosive device. Instead, they tend to create large fireballs where most of the damage is a result of thermal (heat) effects."

• "Potential Vulnerabilities of U.S. Drinking Water and Wastewater Treatment Facilities to Insider Terrorism", August 11, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation reveal that "information recently brought to the attention of DHS and FBI indicates that prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks; terrorists discussed possible attacks against U.S. facilities and systems to disrupt drinking water supplies serving major urban areas, which include large-capacity water reservoirs and water treatment facilities. Although no specific targets were selected, one specific site in the Northeastern United States was mentioned as an example." Moreover, "terrorists mentioned inserting a poison (not further identified) into the chlorination section of the water treatment facility. To accomplish this objective, they discussed recruiting insiders to work with them."
  

• "Potential for Terrorist Use of Rental Vehicles: Indicators for the Car, Truck, and Limousine Rental Community", August 5, 2004. The Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation write, "the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City attacks were carried out with rented vehicles, highlighting the need for awareness among the car, truck, and limousine rental community of the potential for vehicle-borne attacks in the United States." This bulletin provides "preoperational indicators [that] may be present in the days or weeks prior to an attack."

• "Homeland Security Advisory System Increased to ORANGE for Financial Institutions in Specific Geographical Areas", August 1, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation state, "recent credible and specific intelligence reporting indicates terrorist operatives have done extensive research and reconnaissance activity against major U.S. and international financial institutions in Washington, D.C., Northern New Jersey and New York City. These include: the Citigroup buildings in the New York City area, the New York Stock Exchange Building in New York City, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Buildings in Washington D.C., and the Prudential Insurance Company of America in Newark, New Jersey. The reporting provides a level of detail that is unusually specific, to include information about the interior configurations of these buildings, as well as infrastructure, services, and buildings that surround the targets of interest." For more on this plot, see the NEFA "Target: America" report "The East Coast Buildings Plot."
  

• "Potential Threat to Homeland Using Heavy Transport Vehicles", July 30, 2004. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has become public, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Bureau of Investigation note that "intelligence community reporting reveals that terrorist planners consider trucks to be one of the best tools to breach security measures and carry explosives. Reports further revealed that planning should include acquiring the necessary vehicles through legitimate means to avoid exposure of the planned operation to security officials."
  

• "Tactics and Techniques of Suicide/Homicide Bombers", September 12, 2003. This leaked joint bulletin states "while there is no specific profile for those who have engaged in suicide/homicide bombings, males aged 16-50, seem to dominate. Females are also known to conduct suicide/homicide bombings. The effectiveness of a suicide/homicide bombing attack is largely dependent on how well it is executed rather than the characteristics of the device itself. Terrorists will employ novel methods to artfully conceal suicide devices. Devices may be concealed in jackets, shoes, belts, vests, gym bags and briefcases. Additionally, the potential for terrorists to employ multiple suicide/homicide bombers in which the first attack is designed to cause casualties and draw first responders to the scene specifically to expose them to a second suicide/homicide bomber attack cannot be discounted."
  

• “Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program,"  July 2009. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report titled, "Preliminary Results Show Federal Protective Service’s Ability to Protect Federal Facilities Is Hampered By Weaknesses in Its Contract Security Guard Program.” The report found that “FPS does not fully ensure that its contract security guards have the training and certifications required to be deployed to a federal facility…Moreover, GAO found that FPS does not have a fully reliable system for monitoring and verifying guard training and certification requirements. GAO reviewed 663 randomly selected guard records and found that 62 percent of the guards had at least one expired certification including a declaration that guards have not been convicted of domestic violence, which make them ineligible to carry firearms."
  
  
• "Firearm and Explosives Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records," June 2009. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report titled, "Firearm and Explosives Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records." The report addresses a request from Congress to update a January 2005 report titled "Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records." According to the report, "from February 2004 through February 2009, FBI data show that 963 NICS background checks resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records; of these matches, approximately 90 percent were allowed to proceed because the
  checks revealed no prohibiting information and about 10 percent were denied."
  
  
•  "Military and Dual-Use Technology: Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export," June 2009. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report titled, "Military and Dual-Use Technology: Covert Testing Shows Continuing Vulnerabilities of Domestic Sales for Illegal Export." The report found that "GAO found that sensitive dual-use and military technology can be easily and legally purchased from manufacturers and distributors within the United States and illegally exported without detection. Using a bogus front company and fictitious identities, GAO purchased sensitive items including night-vision scopes currently used by U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan to identify targets, triggered spark gaps used to detonate nuclear weapons, electronic sensors used in improvised explosive devices, and gyro chips used in guided missiles and military aircraft. Interviews with cognizant officials at State and Commerce and a review of laws governing the sale of the types of items GAO purchased showed there are few restrictions on domestic sales of these items. GAO was also able to export a number of dummy versions of these items using the mail to a country that is a known transshipment point for terrorist organizations and foreign governments attempting to acquire sensitive technology."
  
  
• "Department of State: Undercover Tests Reveal Significant Vulnerabilities in State’s Passport Issuance Process," March 2009. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report following an investigation that "shows that terrorists or criminals could steal an American citizen’s identity, use basic counterfeiting skills to create fraudulent documentation for that identity, and obtain a genuine U.S. passport from State. GAO conducted four tests simulating this approach and was successful in obtaining a genuine U.S. passport in each case. In the most egregious case, an undercover GAO investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the Social Security Number (SSN) of a man who died in 1965. In another case, the investigator obtained a passport using counterfeit documents and the genuine SSN of a fictitious 5-year-old child GAO created for a previous investigation—even though the investigator’s counterfeit documents and application indicated he was 53 years old. All four passports were issued to the same GAO investigator, under four different names. In all four tests, GAO used counterfeit and/or fraudulently obtained documents. State and USPS employees did not identify GAO’s documents as counterfeit."
  
  
•  "Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials," June 2008. In a report compiled for Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) wrote that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) "is developing a National Source Tracking System to replace the interim database and provide more comprehensive, frequently updated information on potentially dangerous sources. However, this system has been delayed by 18 months and is not expected to be fully operational until January 2009...NRC is also developing a Web-based licensing system that will include more comprehensive information on all sources and materials that require NRC or state approval to possess. Finally, NRC is developing a license verification system that will draw information from the other new systems to enable officials and vendors to verify that those seeking to bring these radioactive materials into the country or purchase them are licensed to do so. However, these systems are more than 3 years behind schedule and may not include the licensing information, initially at least, on radioactive materials regulated by agreement states—which represent over 80 percent of all U.S. licenses for such materials. The delays in the deployment and full development of these systems are especially consequential because NRC has identified their deployment as key to improving the control and accountability of radioactive materials."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas," April 2008. In a report compiled for Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that "the United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]." GAO added that "no comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007)." GAO recommended that "the National Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed appropriate, work to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close the associated safe haven in Pakistan’s FATA region."
  
  
• "Embassy Security: Upgrades Have Enhanced Security, but Site Conditions Prevent Full Adherence to Standards," January 2008. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined security measures in place at 11 U.S. Embassies in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America. GAO investigators determined that at the 11 posts, site conditions prevented the Embassies "from adhering fully with standards. For example, more than one post’s urban location prevented it from achieving a 100-foot setback from the street, a key security standard. As a result, many buildings and their occupants may remain vulnerable to attack."  
  
  
• "Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Exposed Through Covert Testing of TSA's Passenger Screening Process," November 2007. This report reveals that "GAO investigators succeeded in passing through TSA security screening checkpoints undetected with components for several improvised explosive devices (IED) and an improvised incendiary device (IID) concealed in their carry-on luggage and on their persons."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists," May 2007. The authors of this report write, "following the 9/11 attacks, the President issued a series of strategies that provided broad direction for overseas law enforcement efforts to assist foreign nations to identify, disrupt, and prosecute terrorists. However, these strategies did not articulate which LEAs should implement the guidance to enhance efforts to help foreign nations combat terrorism or how they should do so. While one of the strategies tasked State with developing and coordinating U.S. efforts to combat terrorism abroad, we found State did not develop or coordinate the development of a plan to use the combined capabilities of U.S. LEAs to help foreign nations identify, disrupt, or prosecute terrorists."
  
  
• "Homeland Security: Progress Has Been Made to Address the Vulnerabilities Exposed by 9/11, but Continued Federal Action is Needed to Further Mitigate Security Risks," January 2007. This document argues that "DHS and others need to follow through on outstanding congressional requirements and recommendations by GAO and others to enhance security and coordination of passengers and checked baggage, and improve screening procedures for domestic flights, among other needed improvements."
  
  
• "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Progress Coordinating Government and Private Sector Efforts Varies by Sectors' Characteristics," October 2006. According to this report, "All 17 critical infrastructure sectors have established their respective government councils, and nearly all sectors have initiated their voluntary private sector councils in response to the NIPP [DHS' National Infrastructure Protection Plan]. However, council activities have varied due to council characteristics and level of maturity. For example, the public health and health-care sector is quite diverse and collaboration has been difficult as a result; on the other hand, the nuclear sector is quite homogenous and has a long history of collaboration. As a result, council activities have ranged from getting organized to refining infrastructure protection strategies."
   
  
• "Terrorist Financing: Better Strategic Planning Needed to Coordinate U.S. Efforts to Deliver Counter-Terrorism Financing Training and Technical Assistance Abroad", October 2005. According to this report, "the U.S. government lacks an integrated strategy to coordinate the delivery of counter-terrorism financing training and technical assistance to countries vulnerable to terrorist financing."
  
  
• "Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records", January 2005. This report determined that "federal and state procedures—developed and disseminated under the Department of Justice’s direction—do not address the specific types of information from valid-match background checks that can or should be provided to federal counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained."
  
  
• "Potential Terrorist Attacks: Additional Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical Financial Market Participants", November 2003. According to this report, "9 of the 15 [financial market] organizations [reviewed], including 2 GAO considered critical to the functioning of the financial markets, had limitations in their protection and recovery measures, which increased the risk of their operations being disrupted."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat", May 2003. This report states, "GAO was requested to produce this report to assist congressional committees with their responsibilities to oversee federal programs to combat terrorism overseas. Specifically, this report describes the interagency framework for planning, executing, and coordinating related federal efforts. In addition, this report identifies and describes the programs and activities to detect and prevent terrorist attacks, disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations, and respond to terrorist incidents."
  
  
• "Homeland Security: Justice Department's Project to Interview Aliens after September 11, 2001", April 2003. This report concludes, "DOJ asserted that the project netted intelligence information and had a disruptive effect on terrorists. But the results are difficult to measure, and DOJ has not fully analyzed all the data obtained from the interviews or how effectively the project was implemented."
  
  
• "Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing", April 2003. According to this report, "nine federal agencies—which prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) spanned the Departments of Defense, Justice, State, Transportation, and the Treasury—develop and maintain 12 watch lists. These lists include overlapping but not identical sets of data, and different policies and procedures govern whether and how these data are shared with others. As a general rule, this sharing is more likely to occur among federal agencies than between federal agencies and either state and local government agencies or private entities. Further, the extent to which such sharing is accomplished electronically is constrained by fundamental differences in the watch lists’ systems architecture (that is, the hardware, software, network, and data characteristics of the systems)."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Guide Services' Antiterrorism Efforts at Installations", November 2002. Government Accountability Office investigators concluded that "for the most part, the service headquarters and commands...reviewed did not use a comprehensive results-oriented management framework to guide their antiterrorism efforts."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Actions Needed to Improve Force Protection for DOD Deployments through Domestic Seaports", October 2002. This document alleges that "the security environment at strategic seaports remains uncertain because comprehensive assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and critical port infrastructure and functions have not been completed, and no effective mechanism exists to coordinate and disseminate threat information at the seaports."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Department of State Programs to Combat Terrorism Abroad", September 2002. This report examines the State Department's "multifaceted activities...to prevent terrorist attacks on Americans abroad."
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations", September 2001. This report assesses 1) the current framework for leadership and coordination of federal agencies’ efforts to combat terrorism on U.S. soil, and proposals for change; 2) progress the federal government has made in developing and implementing a national strategy to combat terrorism domestically; 3) the federal government’s capabilities to respond to a domestic terrorist incident; 4) progress the federal government has made in helping state and local emergency responders prepare for a terrorist incident; and 5) progress made in developing and implementing a federal strategy for combating cyber-based attacks.
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: How Five Foreign Countries are Organized to Combat Terrorism", April 2000. This report analyzes five countries and the organizational structures they utilize to combat terrorism. 
  
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Analysis of Federal Counterterrorist Exercises", June 1999. This analysis examines the "201 counterterrorism exercises in the 3 years following PDD 39."
   
  
• "Combating Terrorism: Issues to be Resolved to Improve Counterterrorism Operations", May 1999. Government Accountability Office investigator determined that "federal agencies have not completed interagency guidance and resolved command and control issues" in counterterrorism operations.
  
  
• "Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Responsibilities for De veloping Explosives and Narcotics Detection Technologies", April 1997. This document concluded that "the cognizant agencies have not yet agreed to formal understandings on how to establish standards for explosives detection systems, profiling and targeting systems, and deploying canine teams at airports. In addition, they have not agreed on how to resolve issues related to a joint-use strategy and liability."
  
  
• "Counterterrorism: Role of Interpol and the U.S. National Central Bureau", June 1987. This report examines the role on the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and the U.S. National Central Bureau in combating terrorism. 
  
  
• "Terrorism: Laws Cited Imposing Sanctions on Nations Supporting Terrorism", April 1987. This document was produced in response to a request by New Jersey Senator Frank Lautenberg to "determine how often and under what circumstances laws imposing sanctions on nations supporting terrorism have been invoked."
  

• "Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security", September 2008. The Homeland Security Advisory Council has released a report titled "The Top Ten Challenges Facing the Next Secretary of Homeland Security." One of the key challenges highlighted was to "continue to improve intelligence and information sharing."
  

• "Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force", January 2007. This report concludes that "there is every indication that the number and magnitude of attacks on the United States, its interests and its allies will likely increase." Further, "the most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology." The report also makes a number of recommendations, including: 1) "The Department should work with subject matter experts to ensure that the lexicon used within public statements is clear, precise and does not play into the hands of the extremists"; 2) "Broader avenues of dialogue with the Muslim community should be identified and pursued by the Department to foster mutual respect and understanding, and ultimately trust."

• "Report of the Future of Terrorism Task Force - Powerpoint Summary", January 2007. This PowerPoint explains that "in June 2006, the Secretary directed the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to create a Future of Terrorism Task Force (FOTTF) to accomplish the following: Assess future threats to the United States and U.S. interests abroad over the next five years; Strategically fine-tune departmental structures and processes to meet those threats; Recommend how to better engage and prepare the American public for present and future challenges."
  

• "Statement by Ambassador-at-Large Dell L. Dailey", July 2008. Ambassador-at-Large Dell L. Dailey, Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
  U.S. Department of State, testified about "how the USG can better leverage foreign assistance to counter terrorism (CT)."
  

• "Statement by Patricia A. McNerney", July 2008. Patricia A. McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, argued that "foreign aid plays a critical role in helping to prevent irresponsible states and terrorists from acquiring WMD by shrinking the supply of such capabilities, increasing the likelihood of a successful WMD detection and interdiction, and building tools to execute an effective response to a WMD incident."   

• "Giving a Voice to Open Source Stakeholders: A Survey of State, Local & Tribal Law Enforcement", September 2008. A report released by the majority staff of the House Homeland Security Committee concluded that "DHS – the lead Federal agency responsible for sharing terrorism threat and vulnerability information with State and local law enforcement – has yet to articulate a vision for how it will collect, analyze and disseminate open source information." The report revealed that "DHS for the past year has assigned exactly one employee to the task of producing unclassified intelligence products based on open source information." Furthermore, "while at least some of I&A’s [DHS Intelligence & Analysis'] intelligence products are reaching State, local, and tribal law enforcement, distribution is uneven and scattered across too many systems."
  

• "Tobacco and Terror: How Cigarette Smuggling is Funding our Enemies Abroad", April 2008. A report -- released by the Republican staff of the House Homeland Security Committee and based on interviews with law enforcement sources and New York State Department of Taxation and Finance officials -- reveals that recent investigations have "directly linked those involved in illicit tobacco trade to...Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda."

• "Detour Ahead: Critical Vulnerabilities in America's Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs", June 2006. This report charges that "the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have failed to produce a comprehensive strategy to secure America’s rail and mass transit systems. In addition, the Department and TSA continue to focus almost exclusively on aviation security, spending, on average, $9 per air passenger, as compared to only one penny per rail/mass transit security passenger."
  

• "A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat at the Southwest Border". According to this report, "the number of aliens other than Mexican ('OTMs') illegally crossing the border has grown at an alarming rate over the past several years. Based on U.S. Border Patrol statistics there were 30,147 OTMs apprehended in FY2003, 44,614 in FY2004, 165,178 in FY2005, and 108,025 in FY2006. Most of them were apprehended along the U.S. Southwest border. The sheer increase of OTMs coming across the border makes it more difficult for Border Patrol agents to readily identify and process each, thereby increasing the chances that a potential terrorist could slip through the system. Moreover, there is no concrete mechanism for determining how many OTMs evade apprehensions and successfully enter the country illegally."
  

• "The Oklahoma City Bombing: Was There a Foreign Connection?", December 2006. According to this report, "There is serious, yet in some cases circumstantial, evidence that suggests a possible Middle Eastern connection to the Oklahoma City bombing...: For example, of all the cities in the world, convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef and Terry Nichols were in Cebu City in the Philippines at the same time three months before the Oklahoma City bombing. Yousef was the perpetrator of the first World Trade Center attack as well as the mastermind behind the planning of other high-profile attacks on Americans. Furthermore, Ramzi Yousef’s phone records, from the months before he detonated the first World Trade Center bomb in early 1993, show calls placed to the Filipina neighbor and close friend of Terry Nichols’ in-laws in Queens, New York. The opportunity for interaction between American terrorist, Nichols, and al-Qaeda terrorist, Yousef, is evident."
  

• "Statement by FBI Supervisory Special Agent Bassem Youssef", May 2008. In a statement submitted to the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Bassem Youssef -- who also serves as Chief of the Counterterrorism Division’s Communications Analysis Unit -- alleged that "the FBI’s counterterrorism program cannot properly protect the United States from another catastrophic and direct attack from Middle Eastern terrorists."  He highlights a number of problems with the FBI's counterterrorism program. For example, he states, "The FBI recruits supervisors into the critical ITOS units who have no experience in counterterrorism and who did not even want to work in these positions." Youssef further cites "misidentification of threats" and "over-reliance upon technology" as serious issues.

• "al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat", June 2006. The content in this report includes an overview of the strategic threat posed by Al-Qaida, the impact of the Iraq war on the global jihad, background on other jihadist groups (JI, LIFG, GSPC, etc.), and information on terrorist exploitation of the Internet. The report also discusses radical Islamic groups operating in the U.S. 

• "ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen 'High Value Detainees' in CIA Custody", February 2007. A "Strictly Confidential" February 2007 Red Cross report on the treatment of 14 "high value detainees" in CIA custody has become public. According to the report, "the ICRC clearly considers that the allegations of the fourteen include descriptions of treatment and interrogation techniques – singly or in combination – that amounted to torture and/or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”

• "Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism", May 2000. The National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, noted that "international terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America. This was underscored by the December 1999 arrests in Jordan and at the U.S./Canadian border of foreign nationals who were allegedly planning to attack crowded millennium celebrations. Today’s terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United States. This makes terrorist attacks more difficult to detect and prevent."
  

• "Testimony of NCTC Director Mike Leiter: Eight Years After 9/11: Confronting the Terrorist Threat to the Homeland", September 2009. In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, NCTC Director Mike Leiter commented, "Although al-Shabaab has not yet conducted an attack outside of Somalia, we have identified several potential transnational terrorist plots involving individuals trained in Somalia. For example, Australian police in August arrested four men involved in plotting an attack against an Australian Army base, two of whom reportedly trained at camp in Somalia extremists."
  
  
• "2008 Report on Terrorism", April 2009. In releasing its "2008 Report on Terrorism", the National Counterterrorism Center noted that in 2008 there were "numerous 'near misses' and disrupted plots." There were "50,000 people killed/wounded in 2008 in acts of terrorism" and "over 50% of all victims were Muslims –most killed/wounded by Islamic extremists."
  

• "Report on Terrorism Press Conference Slides", April 2009. This briefing includes a valuable comparison of the density of incidents in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2006 vs. 2008.
  

• "2007 Report on Terrorism", April 2008. According to NCTC, "Approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred in various countries during 2007,
  resulting in over 22,000 deaths. Compared to 2006, attacks remained approximately the same in 2007 while deaths rose by 1,800, a 9 percent increase from last year’s number. As was the case in the previous two years, the largest number of reported attacks and deaths occurred in Near East and South Asia. These two regions accounted for about 87 percent of the 355 casualty attacks that killed 10 or more people—only 45 casualty attacks occurred in Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Europe & Eurasia, and Western Hemisphere.
  

• "Report on Terrorist Incidents – 2006", April 2007. NCTC wrote, "According to open-source information, approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred in various countries during 2006, resulting in over 20,000 deaths. As compared with 2005, attacks in 2006 rose by 3,000, a 25 percent increase, while deaths rose by 5,800, a 40 percent increase. As was the case last year, by far the largest number of reported terrorist incidents and deaths occurred in the Near East and South Asia. These two regions also were the locations for 90 percent of the nearly 300 high-casualty attacks in
  2006 that killed 10 or more people—only a total of five high-casualty attacks occurred in Europe-Eurasia, East Asia-Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere."
  

• "Annex of Statistical Information", April 2007. This data is provided to the State Department to aid it in the production of its annual report on terrorism.
  

• "National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel", May 2006. To "fight terrorist travel globally," the National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel identified eight key steps: "1. Identify known or suspected terrorists. 2. Ensure broad data sharing across the US Government and with partner nations. 3. Screen travelers effectively both before reaching and at ports of entry into the United States. 4. Build partner capacity to limit and screen for terrorist travel. 5. Detect and apprehend terrorists who intend to enter, or who may have entered, the United States. 6. Dismantle infrastructures and networks that facilitate terrorist travel. 7. Strengthen travel and document security at home and abroad to ensure that terrorists cannot acquire documentation through legal or illicit means. 8. Collect, analyze and disseminate all terrorist travel information to key consumers across the counterterrorism and law enforcement communities."
  

• "Report on Incidents of Terrorism – 2005 ", April 2006. According to the NCTC, "approximately 11,000 terrorist attacks occurred in 2005 and resulted in over 14,500 deaths."
  

• "A Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for 2004". The NCTC explains that it "originally compiled this chronology of significant, international terrorist incidents in support of the Department of State's publication 'Patterns of Global Terrorism,'...The Department has decided to submit a new report, 'Country Reports on Terrorism,' in fulfillment of its reporting mandate. As the newly created 'knowledge bank' of the U.S. Government on international terrorism, the NCTC is providing this original chronology for the American public."
  

• "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World", November 2008. The National Intelligence Council produced "Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World" "to stimulate strategic thinking about the future by identifying key trends, the factors that drive them, where they seem to be headed, and how they might interact." Addressing the arc of terrorism in 2025, the authors wrote, "Terrorism is unlikely to disappear by 2025, but its appeal could diminish if economic growth continues and youth unemployment is mitigated in the Middle East. Economic opportunities for youth and greater political pluralism probably would dissuade some from joining terrorists’ ranks, but others— motivated by a variety of factors, such as a desire for revenge or to become martyrs— will continue to turn to violence to pursue their objectives."
  

• "National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland", July 2007. According to this report, "Al-Qa’ida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qa’ida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here."

• "Mapping the Global Future: Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project". This unclassified report, produced by the National Intelligence Council, "takes a long-term view of the future. It offers a fresh look at how global trends might develop over the next decade and a half to influence world events. Mindful that there are many possible 'futures,' our report offers a range of possibilities...as a way of opening our minds to developments we might otherwise miss." 
  

• "Declassified Key Judgments of the National Intelligence Estimate - Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States", April 2006. This report provides an overview of trends in the global jihad; it also argues that "the jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate political solution an ultra-conservative interpretation of sharia-based governance spanning the Muslim world is unpopular with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists' propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek to persuade."
  

• "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat", Revised September 2009. Under pressure from Muslim groups, the NYPD has released a new version of its groundbreaking "Radicalization in the West" report that includes a two page "statement of clarification." According to the statement, "NYPD understands that it is a tiny minority of Muslims who subscribe to al Qaeda’s ideology of war and terror and that the NYPD’s focus on al Qaeda inspired terrorism should not be mistaken for any implicit or explicit justification for racial, religious or ethnic profiling. Rather, the Muslim community in New York City is our ally..." Further, "Al Qaeda inspired terrorism is not the only type of terrorism that New York City has faced. In fact, before 9/11, other religious and ethnic groups were responsible for more terrorist related deaths of New Yorkers than any Islamic group." And "during the early stages of radicalization, the behaviors associated with a greater degree of religiosity, in and of themselves, cannot be used as a signature of someone potentially becoming a terrorist." Finally, "The NYPD reiterates that this report was not intended to be policy prescriptive for law enforcement."
  
  
• "Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat", August 2007. According to Raymond Kelly, NYPD Commissioner, "the aim of this report is to assist policymakers and law enforcement officials, both in Washington and throughout the country, by providing a thorough understanding of the kind of threat we face domestically. It also seeks to contribute to the debate among intelligence and law enforcement agencies on how best to counter this emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process."
  

• Summary of Terrorist Threats to New York City. This document notes that "the on-going and continuous threat to the City is underscored by a long series of events that make clear that New York City" faces a "persistent threat." Those events include: the Iyman Faris case, the subway cyanide plot, reconnaissance by Iranian agents, the Citigroup/Stock Exchange case, the Herald Square case, and the PATH plot.   

• "Mumbai Combined Arms Operation", December 2008. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) is a Federal Advisory Committee with a U.S. Government Charter to promote security cooperation between American business and private sector interests worldwide and the U.S. Department of State. In a report on the Mumbai attacks, OSAC provides a summary of key points about the plot and analyzes the operatives' tactics.
  

• "Osama Bin Laden: A Case Study", 1999. In 1999, Dr. Gary W. Richter of the Sandia National Laboratories compiled a 393 page "open-source examination of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden, his al Qaeda organization, and allied terrorist organizations." The report, which recently became public, "includes a summary of the relevant history, the lessons learned from the 1998 African embassy bombings and from the follow-on cruise-missile strikes, the threat of future attacks using weapons of mass destruction, a set of observations, conclusions and recommendations."

• "Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials", January 2000. The authors -- a Psychologist for the Secret Service and the Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the Secret Service's Intelligence Division -- write, "drawing from project findings, this guide describes an approach to threat assessment and the protective intelligence investigative process that can be of assistance to Federal, State, and local law enforcement and security professionals with protective intelligence responsibilities. Though not intended to serve as an operations manual, the guide presents information and ideas about developing and implementing protective intelligence programs and activities."
  

• "Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody ", November 2008 (Released April 2009). In releasing its "Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody," the Senate Armed Services Committee stated, "The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of 'a few bad apples' acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts
  damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. This report is a product of the Committee's inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about."
  

• "Statement by Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, Commander, US Southern Command ", March 2009. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN, Commander, US Southern Command, stated, "One specific area of increasing concern is the nexus of illicit drug trafficking – including routes, profits, and corruptive influence – and terrorism. In the Western Hemisphere, the illicit drug trade historically has contributed, and continues to contribute, significant financial resources to known terrorist groups like the FARC in Colombia and the Shining Path in Peru. Another threat to the United States is the nexus with Islamic radical terrorism. In August of last year, U.S. Southern Command supported a Drug Enforcement Administration operation, in coordination with host countries, which targeted a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking organization in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Last October, we supported another interagency operation that resulted in the arrests of several dozen individuals in Colombia associated with a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking and money laundering ring." He also noted that, "Islamic terrorist networks are present in the Tri-border Area, as well as several other locations in the region. A robust Hizballah financial support network exists in the region, as well as an active group of sympathizers and supporters of Hizballah. Also present are Sunni groups, including Hamas, whose members possess operational backgrounds. Moreover, known al-Qa’ida members have journeyed to Latin America and the Caribbean and other terrorist-inspired Islamic radicals have been arrested in the region."

• "Statement by DIA Director Michael Maples: Annual Threat Assessment", March 2009. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, DIA Director Michael Maples stated that, "While the Taliban lost several key commanders in 2008, steady access to local Pashtun and foreign fighters has allowed them to sustain operations. Al-Qaida’s presence in Afghanistan has increased to levels unseen since 2001-2002. Al-Qaida collaborates
  closely with the Taliban and other insurgent elements and supports the insurgency with personnel, training and resources, particularly in Afghanistan’s south and east. Taliban and al-Qaida use of information operations have played to both domestic and international audiences, raising the profile of the insurgency and encouraging additional financial and personnel support." He added, "Al-Qaida increasingly lost operatives, including senior planners and trainers, to counter-terrorism operations in Pakistan. Mid-level operatives rise to advance plans and operations; however, sustained counter-terrorism operations strain the group’s ability to recuperate from leadership losses, degrade transnational attack capabilities, and disrupt regional attack planning. Nevertheless, capable al-Qaida operatives remain."
  

• "Senate Armed Services Committee Report of its Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody - Executive Summary and Conclusions", December 2008. According to a report by the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of 'a few bad apples' acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. Those efforts damaged our ability to collect accurate intelligence that could save lives, strengthened the hand of our enemies, and compromised our moral authority. This report is a product of the Committee’s inquiry into how those unfortunate results came about." 

• "Senate Armed Services Committee Report of its Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody - Statement of Sen. Carl Levin", December 2008. Senator Carl Levin commented, "The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody compromised our moral authority and damaged both our ability to attract allies to our side in the fight against terrorism and to win the support of people around the world for that effort. In May 2004, just after the pictures from Abu Ghraib became public, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz said that the abuses depicted were simply the result of a few 'bad apples' and that those responsible for abuse would be held accountable. More than seven months later, then-White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Asked about accountability for detainee abuses, Gonzales said 'we care very much about finding out what happened and holding people accountable.' Neither of those two statements was true. Department of Defense investigations into detainee abuse failed to adequately assign accountability to those senior military and civilian officials who authorized abusive interrogation techniques...As we began to dig into what happened, the influence of SERE (Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape) resistance training techniques on our interrogation policies and practices became more and more obvious and became the focus of our investigation."
  

• "Committee Hearing on the Authorization of SERE Techniques for Interrogations in Iraq: Part II of the Committee’s Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody - Statement of Sen. Carl Levin", September 2008. Senator Carl Levin explained, "In June 2008, this Committee held a hearing on the origins of aggressive interrogation techniques used against detainees in U.S. custody at Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere. At that hearing, the Committee heard how techniques such as stress positions, forced nudity, and sleep deprivation – used in military Survival Evasion Resistance and Escape or 'SERE' training to teach U.S. personnel to resist abusive interrogations, and based, in part, on Chinese Communist techniques used during the Korean war to elicit false confessions – were turned on their head and authorized at senior levels of our government for use in interrogations of detainees in U.S. custody. Today’s hearing will cover one way that those techniques made their way to Iraq."

• "The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques - Index of Documents: Part II", September 2008. These documents were used by the Committee in the course of its investigation.

• "The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques - Statement of Sen. Carl Levin", June 2008. Senator Carl Levin stated, "how did it come about that American military personnel stripped detainees naked, put them in stress positions, used dogs to scare them, put leashes around their necks to humiliate them, hooded them, deprived them of sleep, and blasted music at them. Were these actions the result of “a few bad apples” acting on their own? It would be a lot easier to accept if it were. But that’s not the case. The truth is that senior officials in the United States government sought information on aggressive techniques, twisted the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. In the process, they damaged our ability to collect intelligence that could save lives."

• "The Origins of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques - Index of Documents: Part I", June 2008. These documents were used by the Committee in the course of its investigation.
  

• "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq: Testimony of General David Petraeus", April 2008. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General David Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, reported on "significant but uneven security progress in Iraq" over the prior seven months. Petraeus stated, "since September, levels of violence and civilian deaths have been reduced substantially, Al Qaeda-Iraq and a number of other extremist elements have been dealt serious blows, the capabilities of Iraqi Security Force elements have grown, and there has been noteworthy involvement of local Iraqis in local security. Nonetheless, the situation in certain areas is still unsatisfactory and innumerable challenges remain. Moreover, as events in the past two weeks have reminded us and as I have repeatedly cautioned, the progress made since last spring is fragile and reversible." Significantly, he added that the U.S. military has "also focused on the Special Groups. These elements are funded, trained, armed, and directed by Iran’s Qods Force, with help from Lebanese Hezbollah."
  

• "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq: Charts Accompanying the Testimony of General David Petraeus", April 2008. These slides accompany the testimony of General David Petraeus, Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq.
  

• "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq: Testimony of Ambassador Ryan Crocker", April 2008. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Ryan Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, commented on recent events in Basrah. He said, "a wildcard remains the Sadrist Trend – and whether the Iraqis can continue to drive a wedge between other elements of the Trend and Iranian-supported Special Groups. A dangerous development in the immediate wake of the Basrah operation was what appeared to be a reunification between Special Groups and the mainline Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). We also saw a potential collapse of the JAM 'freeze' in military operations. As the situation unfolded however, Muqtada as-Sadr issued a statement that disavowed anyone possessing 'heavy weapons' – which would include the signature weapons of the Special Groups. This statement can further sharpen the distinction between members of the Sadrist Trend, who should not pose a threat to the Iraqi state, and members of Special Groups, who very much do."
  

• "Statement by DIA Director Michael Maples: Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States", February 2008. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, DIA Director Michael Maples admitted that "Al-Qaida's presence in Afghanistan is increasing to levels unseen since 2001-2001. Al-Qaida supports the Afghan insurgency with personnel, training, and resources, particularly in Afghanistan's south and east." Further, "Iran seeks to expand its influence in Afghanistan...Tehran advances its goals through legitimate business and humanitarian efforts along with weapon shipments..." Assessing the threat from Hezbollah, Maples said, "Hizballah has a near global reach...If Hizballah perceives significant U.S. involvement [in the Imad Mugniyeh assassination], attacks against U.S. interests are also likely." Maples also acknowledged that Hezbollah "receives some funds from associates who profit from the drug trade." 
  

• "Statement by Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell: Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community", February 2008. Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell testified, "we assess that al-Qa'ida's Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population." McConnell also stated, "we judge al-Qa'ida will continue to attempt attacks in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain."
  

• "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America: Statement by FBI Associate Exec. Assistant Director, National Security Branch, Philip Mudd", March 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America," senior FBI official Philip Mudd stated that "In Minneapolis, we believe there has been an active and deliberate attempt to recruit individuals—all of whom are young men, some only in their late teens—to travel to Somalia to fight or train on behalf of al-Shabaab. We assess that for the majority of these individuals, the primary motivation for such travel was to defend their place of birth from the Ethiopian invasion, although an appeal was also made based on their shared Islamic identity. A range of socio-economic conditions—such as violent youth crime and gang subcultures, and tensions over cultural integration—may have also played some role in the recruitment process. We also note that several of the travelers from Minneapolis came from single-parent households, potentially making them more susceptible to recruitment from charismatic male authority figures."
  

• "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America: Statement by Deputy Director for Intelligence, National Counterterrorism Center, Andrew Liepman ", March 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America," Deputy Director for Intelligence, NCTC, Andrew Liepman stated "The Somali-American youth who have traveled abroad to join and fight for al-Shabaab were likely exposed to al-Shabaab’s extremist ideology in the United States, most likely through sustained interaction with extremists—in person and via the Internet—and exposure to jihadist literature and videos circulated on the Internet."
  

• "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America: Statement by Osman Ahmed ", March 2009.  Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "al-Shabaab Recruitment in America," Osman Ahmed (President, Riverside Plaza Tenants Association) spoke on behalf of the "Victim Families Whose Children Have been Recruited And Kidnapped To Somalia." He revealed that "Family members whose children [were] sent to Somalia were scared to even talk to the law enforcement. We have been painted as bad people within the Somali community by the mosque management. We have been threatened for just speaking out. Some members of Abu-Bakr Al-Saddique mosque told us that if we talk about the issue, the Muslim center will be destroyed and Islamic communities will be wiped out. They tell parents that if they report their missing kid to the FBI that FBI will send the parents to Guantanamo Jail. And this message has been [a] very effective tool to silence parents and the community. They do have a lot cash to use for propaganda machine. They strike fear on a daily basis, here in Minneapolis, among Somali speaking community in order to stop the community to cooperate with the law enforcement. Public threats were issued to us at Abu-Bakar Assidique for simply speaking with CNN and Newsweek. The other mystery is that they say something in Somali TVs, at their congregations and say something contrary to that in English while speaking to the mainstream media or community."
  

• "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks: Statement by FBI Chief Intelligence Officer Donald Van Duyn", January 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks," FBI Chief Intelligence Officer Donald Van Duyn revealed, "the FBI is investigating a limited number of individuals across the United States who are linked in some way to LT [Lashkar-e-Taiba]—primarily through witting or unwitting fundraising for the group, as well as the recruitment of individuals from the United States to attend LT camps abroad."

• "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks: Statement by DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charles Allen", January 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks," DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Charles Allen worried that, "Response to a similar terrorist attack in a major U.S. urban city would be complicated and difficult. The chaos the attacks created magnified the difficulty of mounting an appropriate response. First responders, in order to deal with such a crisis, must first and foremost have adequate information on what is occuring as well as the capability to mount a rapid and effective response that minimizes the impact of the attack. In Mumbai it was not immediately clear to authorities whether there were multiple attack groups or a single group. The attackers were able to exploit the initial confusion because of the indiscriminate firings to move on to new targets. While preparedness training for this type of attack may not have prevented it, the effects likely could have been mitigated and reduced if authorities had been prepared and had exercised responses to terrorist attacks across all levels of government."
  

• "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks: Statement by NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly", January 2009. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "Lessons from the Mumbai Attacks," NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly argued that "When lives are at stake, law enforcement needs to find ways to disrupt cell phones and other communications in a pinpointed way against terrorists who are using them." He also noted that "In Mumbai, the attackers appeared to know their targets better than responding commandos. With this in mind, since the beginning of December, the New York City Police Department has toured several major hotels. Supervisors in our Emergency Service Unit are documenting the walkthroughs on video camera, filming entrances and exits, lobbies, unoccupied guest rooms, and banquet halls. We plan to use the videos as training tools."
  

• "Statement by NCTC Director Michael Leiter: Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It", July 2008. Testifying before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs during a hearing titled "Roots of Violent Islamist Extremism and Efforts to Counter It," National Counterterrorism Center Director Michael Leiter stated, "Many of the themes in al-Qa’ida propaganda, however, exploit viewpoints that are widespread in Muslim countries. The fact that many Muslims sympathize with grievances claimed by al-Qa’ida yet the overwhelming majority of Muslims reject al-Qa’ida’s actions suggests that political or economic grievances alone are not sufficient to explain terrorist recruitment." Leiter also pointed out that "the extremist ideological leanings that set the precedent for many of today’s radical Islamic movements were articulated by Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, during the 1950s and 1960s."
  

• "Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat", May 2008. In a report titled "Violent Islamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat," the Majority and Minority Staff of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs examine "how violent Islamist terrorist groups like al-Qaeda are using the Internet to enlist followers into the global violent Islamist terrorist movement and to increase support for the movement." The report assesses that "the recent rise in acts of homegrown terrorism planning and plotting in the United States may be an early warning that domestic radicalization inspired by violent Islamist ideology has become more likely in the United States." It adds, "left unchallenged, it is very possible that the core terrorist enlistment message espoused over the Internet will drive more individuals in the United States all the way through the four stages of the radicalization process and encourage them to conduct actual terrorist attacks."
  

• "Whether Public Statements Regarding Iraq by U.S. Government Officials Were Substantiated by Intelligence Information", June 2008. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report that documents "administration prewar statements that, on numerous occasions, misrepresented the intelligence and the threat from Iraq." For example, there were "statements and implications by the President and Secretary of State suggesting that Iraq and al-Qa’ida had a partnership, or that Iraq had provided al-Qa’ida with weapons training, were not substantiated by the intelligence." And, "statements by the President and the Vice President indicating that Saddam Hussein was prepared to give weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups for attacks against the United States were contradicted by available intelligence information."
  

• "Intelligence Activities Relating to Iraq Conducted by the Policy Counterterrorism Evaluation Group and the Office of Special Plans Within the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy", June 2008. The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded "that the clandestine meetings between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris were inappropriate and mishandled from beginning to end. Deputy National Security Advisor Steve Hadley and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz failed to keep the Intelligence Community and the State Department appropriately informed about the meetings. The involvement of Manucher Ghobanifer and Michael Ledeen in the meetings was inappropriate. Potentially important information collected during the meetings was withheld from intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials. Finally, senior Defense Department officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts."
  

•  "Statement by Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell: Annual Threat Assessment", February 2008. Testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell reported "we have seen an influx of new Western recruits into the tribal areas [Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas] since mid-2006." He further noted that "al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups are attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and materials (CBRN)." Additionally, "although the ongoing conflict in Iraq will likely absorb most of AQI’s [Al-Qaida in Iraq's] resources over the next year, AQI has leveraged its broad external networks—including some reaching into Europe—in support of external operations. It probably will continue to devote some effort towards honoring Bin Ladin’s request in 2005 that AQI attempt to strike the United States, affirmed publicly by current AQI leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri in a November 2006 threat against the White House...AQI documents captured in Iraq suggest that fewer than 100 AQI terrorists have moved from Iraq to establish cells in other countries." Addressing the situation in the U.S., McConnell stated, "to date, cells detected in the United States have lacked the level of sophistication, experience, and access to resources of terrorist cells overseas. Their efforts, when disrupted, largely have been in the nascent phase, and authorities often were able to take advantage of poor operational tradecraft. However, the growing use of the internet to identify and connect with networks throughout the world offers opportunities to build relationships and gain expertise that previously were available only in overseas training camps."

• "Statement by CIA Director Michael Hayden: Annual Threat Assessment", February 2008. CIA Director Michael Hayden revealed the CIA's involvement in helping "to disrupt terrorist threats targeting European countries in 2007. On 4 September, German authorities arrested three European operatives trained by the Islamic Jihad Union who were planning to bomb targets in Germany, possibly including U.S. facilities. The same day, Danish authorities detained individuals directly linked to al-Qa'ida who were preparing explosives, apparently for use in a terrorist attack."
  

• "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2008", April 2009. The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism has released its annual report documenting trends and significant terrorism-related issues in 2008. The report states, "Al-Qa‘ida (AQ) and associated networks continued to lose ground, both structurally and in the court of world public opinion, but remained the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners in 2008. AQ has reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri. Worldwide efforts to counter terrorist financing have resulted in AQ appealing for money in its last few messages. In the years since 9/11, AQ and its extremist allies have moved across the border to the remote areas of the Pakistani frontier, where they have used this terrain as a safe haven to hide, train terrorists, communicate with followers, plot attacks, and send fighters to support the insurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) provided AQ many of the benefits it once derived from its base across the border in Afghanistan."
  

• "Rewards for Justice: Sirajuddun Haqqani", April 2009. In August 2008, the NEFA Foundation obtained video of a conversation with Taliban Deputy Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of the infamous Afghan mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. Through the Rewards for Justice program, the State Department is offering up to a $5 million reward for information leading to the capture of Haqqani. According to the State Department, Haqqani  "maintains close ties to al-Qa’ida. During an interview with an American news organization, Haqqani admitted planning the January 14, 2008 attack against the Serena Hotel in Kabul that killed six people, including American citizen Thor David Hesla. Haqqani also admitted to having planned the April 2008 assassination attempt on Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He has coordinated and participated in cross-border attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. He is believed to be located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan." 
  

• "Rewards for Justice: Baitullah Mehsud", April 2009. Through the Rewards for Justice program, the State Department is offering up to a $5 million reward for information leading to the capture of Baitullah Mehsud. According to the State Department, "Mehsud is a key al-Qa’ida facilitator in the tribal areas of South Waziristan in Pakistan. Pakistani authorities believe that the January 2007 suicide attack against the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad was staged by militants loyal to Mehsud. Press reports also have linked Mehsud to the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the deaths of other innocent civilians. In addition, Mehsud has stated his intention to attack the United States. He has conducted cross-border attacks against U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and poses a clear threat to American persons and interests in the region."  In June 2008, the NEFA Foundation obtained an exclusive video-recorded interview with Maulvi Faqir Mohammad, a senior commander of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and an acknowledged deputy of Mehsud.
  
  
• "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume II - Money Laundering and Financial Crimes", March 2009. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has released its International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. The second voolume "describes the efforts of 127 states and jurisdictions to implement strong anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes...This report covers calendar year 2008, and its conclusions reflect the Department’s analysis of the international drug control and money laundering environment during the last calendar year."

• "Country Report on Terrorism: 2007", April 2008. The State Department has released its annual report documenting trends and significant terrorism-related issues in 2007. Notably, the report states that Al-Qaida has "reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational capabilities through the exploitation of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), replacement of captured or killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration of some central control by its top leadership, in particular Ayman al-Zawahiri. Although Usama bin Ladin remained the group’s ideological figurehead, Zawahiri has emerged as AQ’s strategic and operational planner."

• "Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism", March 2008. The State Department released a report titled "Contemporary Global Anti-Semitism," which has been "provided to the U.S. Congress to further assess contemporary anti-Semitism by exploring anti-Semitic themes and practices. This report is meant to be used as a resource for increasing understanding of and informing public discourse about contemporary forms of anti-Semitism and for shaping policies to combat anti-Semitism worldwide." The report notes that "terrorist attacks and threats aimed at Jewish communities worldwide have been linked to Islamist terrorist groups, which, in the name of global jihad, have declared their intentions to attack Jews and Jewish targets." And discussing conspiracy theories, it points out that "the first known appearance of the spurious claim that '4,000 Jews' or '4,000 Israelis' knew about the September 11, 2001 attacks beforehand was on Hizballah’s Al-Manar television on September 17, 2001."
  

• "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2006". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation." This report replaced the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" (see below).
  

• "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2005". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation." This report replaced the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" (see below).
  

• "Country Reports on Terrorism: 2004". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation." This report replaced the "Patterns of Global Terrorism" (see below).
  

• "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2003". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation."
  

• "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2002". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation."
  

• "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 2001". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation."
  

• "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation."
  

• "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998". As the State Department explains, "U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation."
  

• "Sudan: Bin Ladin's Deal", August 1996. A SECRET August 1996 State Department document with a section titled "Sudan: Bin Ladin's Deal" has been fully declassified. It states that National Islamic Front leader Hassan Turabi "agreed to the expulsion of terrorist financier Usama bin Ladin on the condition that in the future he be allowed to return...Turabi and President Bashir hoped that when bin Ladin visited he would use false documentation and provincial airports, such as Port Sudan or Kassala, to avoid publicity." Additionally, "Turabi and Bashir...were loath to lose access to bin Ladin's wealth, which has been heavily invested in Sudan."

• "Usama bin Ladin: Who's Chasing Whom?", July 1996. A TOP SECRET July 1996 State Department document titled "Usama bin Ladin: Who's Chasing Whom?" has been fully declassified. The document notes that Bin Laden has "been sighted in the UK, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sudan" since mid-May. Further, information "indicated bin Ladin planned to sponsor suicide car bombings against US interests in the UK, in part to punish London for 'submitting' to US pressure to bar his entry into the UK."

• "The Wandering Mujahidin: Armed and Dangerous". A previously SECRET 1993 State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research product has been declassified and provides an overview of the activities of veterans of the Afghan jihad. In a prophetic assessment, the document states, "the alleged involvement of veterans of the Afghan war in the World Trade Center bombing and the plots against New York targets are a bold example of what tactics some former mujahidin are willing to use in their ongoing jihad...US support of the mujahidin during the Afghan war will not necessarily protect US interests from attack. The growing perception by Muslims that the US follows a double standard with regard to Islamic issues...heightens the possibility that Americans will become the targets of radical Muslims' wrath. Afghan war veterans, scattered throughout the world, could surprise the US with violence in unexpected locales."
  

• "Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1997". This report was published by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, and details violent acts affecting Americans abroad.
  

• "Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1996". This report was published by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, and details violent acts affecting Americans abroad.
  

• "Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1995". This report was published by the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Intelligence and Threat Analysis, and details violent acts affecting Americans abroad.
  

• "Mass Transit System: Threat Assessment", February 2008. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only assessment that has been leaked to the media, the Transportation Security Administration's Office of Intelligence notes that "the U.S. mass transit and passenger rail systems are vulnerable to terrorist attacks because they are accessible to large numbers of the public and are notoriously difficult to secure...Based on assessments of previous al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida-inspired attacks, future attack plotting against mass transit would likely involve small groups of operatives exploding multiple IEDs on rail during rush hour in a major U.S. city." Highlighting the threat posed by insiders, the document states, "Asmin Amin Tariq, a security guard at Heathrow International Airport (LHR), was one of 24 people arrested in connection with the plan to blow up aircraft in the 2006 UK-U.S. transatlantic plot. Tariq helped Islamic extremists pose as airport employees so they could conduct surveillance of security procedures at Heathrow. Tariq allegedly provided information about airport security procedures to the would-be bombers." Further, "Turkish citizen Adem Yilmaz, reportedly a member of the Islamic Jihad Union cell targeting Germany, was arrested in September 2007. Yilmaz was employed in the security division of rail operator Deutsche Bahn from 1997 until 2002. During that time he worked in the railway station of Frankfurt airport. The airport was one of several targets his cell that allegedly considered." However, the document points out that "there is no credible intelligence regarding specific plans by any extremist groups or individuals to perpetrate an act of terrorism against the U.S. mass transit system."
  

• "Incidents at U.S. Airports May Suggest Possible Pre-Attack Probing", July 2007. In an Unclassified/For Official Use Only bulletin that has been leaked to the media, the Transportation Security Administration wrote that "a surge in recent suspicious incidents at U.S. airports may indicate terrorists are conducting pre-attack security probes and 'dry runs' similar to dress rehearsals."
  

• "Criminal Acts Against Civil Aviation: 2001". This document "reports on incidents that have taken place against civil aviation aircraft and interests worldwide. Incidents that are recorded are summarized in regional geographic overviews." The Federal Aviation Administration's Office of Civil Aviation Security compiled prior versions of this report (see above).
  

• "2007 National Money Laundering Strategy". This document is different from prior National Money Laundering Strategies because "it focuses exclusively on deterring money laundering, independent of...efforts to combat the financing of terror."
  

• "2003 National Money Laundering Strategy". According to Treasury, "the 2003 Strategy focuses on three major goals: (1) to cut off access to the international financial system by oney launderers and terrorist financiers more effectively; (2) to enhance the Federal government’s ability to target major money laundering organizations and systems; and (3) strengthen and refine the anti-money laundering regulatory regime for all financial institutions to improve the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement efforts."
  

• "2002 National Money Laundering Strategy". This document states, "since September 11, 2001, our mission has changed in important ways. The 2002 National Money Laundering Strategy breaks important new ground, and, for the first time, describes a coordinated, government-wide strategy to combat terrorist financing."
  

• "2001 National Money Laundering Strategy". The Treasury Department's Office of Enforcement writes, "this year’s Strategy responds to the challenges of anti-money laundering enforcement by providing a comprehensive plan to disrupt and dismantle criminal enterprises and prosecute professional money launderers through aggressive enforcement, measured accountability, preventative efforts, and enhanced coordination."
  

• "U.S. Money Laundering Threat Assessment", December 2005. According to the report's introduction, "the 2005 Money Laundering Threat Assessment (MLTA) is the first government-wide analysis of money laundering in the United States. The report is the product of an interagency working group composed of experts from the spectrum of U.S. Government agencies, bureaus, and offices that study and combat money laundering. The purpose of the MLTA is to help policy makers, regulators, and the law enforcement community better understand the landscape of money laundering in the United States and to support strategic planning efforts to combat money laundering."

• "Audit of USAID/West Bank and Gaza's Assistance to Al-Quds University, the Islamic University in Gaza and American Near East Refugee Aid", December 2007. The audit concluded that "USAID/West Bank and Gaza did not always follow applicable Federal laws, regulations, or USAID policies when providing assistance to" these entities. Documents outlining the Islamic University of Gaza's ties to Hamas can be found in the Holy Land Foundation exhibits section.
  

• "Audit of USAID/West Bank and Gaza's Implementation of Executive Order 13224", December 2007. The "Regional Inspector General in Cairo, Egypt, conducted this audit to determine whether USAID/West Bank and Gaza implemented policies, procedures, and controls to comply with Executive Order 13224, which is intended to block property and prevent transactions with terrorists, potential terrorists, and their supporters...The audit found that USAID/West Bank and Gaza has, in fact, implemented policies, procedures, and controls."
  

•  "USCIRF Confirms Material Inciting Violence, Intolerance Remains in Textbooks Used at Saudi Government's Islamic Saudi Academy", June 2008. The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom examined 17 Arabic-language textbooks at the Islamic Saudi Academy (ISA), a Saudi government school in Northern Virginia. USCIRF "confirmed that these texts...include some extremely troubling passages that do not conform to international human rights norms." Further, "the most problematic texts involve passages that are not directly from the Koran but rather contain the Saudi government's particular interpretation of Koranic and other Islamic texts. Some passages clearly exhort the readers to commit acts of violence..."
  

• "Five Years Post 9/11, One Year Post Katrina: The State of America's Readiness - A 183-City Survey", July 2006. 183 cities responded to a survey asking questions such as 1) Have you received sufficient federal resources to achieve full communications interoperability? and 2) What is your level of confidence that your city is prepared to survive on its own for up to 72 hours immediately following a disaster - natural or manmade?
  

• "The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force", November 2008. The Joint Forces Command released "The Joint Operating Environment: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force," which "is intended to inform joint concept development and experimentation throughout the Department of Defense. It provides a perspective on future trends, shocks, contexts, and implications for future joint force  commanders and other leaders and professionals in the national security field. This document is speculative in nature and does not suppose to predict what will happen in the next twenty-five years. Rather, it is intended to serve as a starting point for discussions about the future security environment at the operational level of war."
  

• "(Fact Sheet) The Joint Operating Environment 2008: Challenges and Implications for the Future Force", November 2008.
  

• "Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and 'Other Means'", October 2008. Based on "interrogation summaries of captured militia fighters, Saddam-era Iraqi intelligence reports, and data listing weapons caches found to contain Iranian-made weapons," West Point's Center for Combating Terrorism has released a report titled "Iranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and "Other Means." The "report addresses Iran's dual-strategy of providing military aid to Iraqi militia groups while simultaneously giving political support to Iraqi political parties." See also: Appendix A: Interrogation Summaries; Appendix B: Documents (Mostly Saddam-Era Iraqi Intelligence Documents), Appendix C: Reports of Iranian Weapons Found in Caches.   

• "Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: al?Qa`ida’s Road In and Out of Iraq", July 2008. West Point's Center for Combating Terrorism  released this report that "expands on and contextualizes an analysis of al-Qa'ida in Iraq personnel records conducted by the CTC in December 2007." See also: AQI Financial and Accounting Documents; Suicide Bomber Contracts, Separation Contracts (fighters leaving Iraq permanently), Temporary Leave Contracts (fighters leaving Iraq temporarily); Partial Contracts, Personnel and Material Records, Syrian Network Report, ISI apology to Sheikh Abad Lufan al-Hadeb, Essay Explaining the Importance of the Banner in Islam, ISI Directive to its Border Emirate, Memo from the MSC to the Border Emirate, Border Activity Report Template, Six-Month ISI Report on Border Activity, Message regarding Abu Umar al-Tunisi, Password Instructions, Samarra Attack Summary Report.

• "Al-Qa'ida's Foreign Fighters in Iraq", December 2007. West Point's Center for Combating Terrorism produced a "preliminary analysis of records containing background information on foreign fighters entering Iraq via Syria over the last year."  
  

• Al-Qaida in Iraq Personnel Records - English; Arabic, December 2007. According to West Point, "in November 2007, the Combating Terrorism Center...received nearly 700 records of foreign nationals that entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007....these personnel records...[were] collected by al-Qa'ida's Iraqi affiliates, first the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC) and then the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). The records contain varying levels of information on each fighter, but often include the fighter's country of origin, hometown, age, occupation, the name of the fighter's recruiter, and even the route the fighter took to Iraq."
  

• "Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa'ida from 1989-2006", September 2007. West Point's Center for Combating Terrorism writes, "very early in al-Qa’ida’s development there emerged two factions, one committed to building an effective guerrilla organization and one bent on establishing al-Qa’ida as a global brand, a battle standard that could be taken up by any and all engaged in violent Islamist resistance. Conflict between these two poles has defined every major leadership schism in al-Qa’ida, with the latter camp, led by Usama bin Ladin, victorious nearly every time. In the end, the 'brand managers' succeeded in converting al-Qa’ida from an allegiance-based paramilitary organization, complete with formalized hierarchies of command and control into an emblem, an ideological banner capable of inspiring homegrown cells of any size, the members of which pledge allegiance not to any particular person, but to the vision of jihad that al-Qa’ida embodies. The origins and consequences of this long-running conflict, even its existence, remain underappreciated by American policymakers." 
   
• "An Assessment of 516 Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) Unclassified Summaries", July 2007. West Point's Center for Combating Terrorism anal analyzed an array of public documents released in connection with Guantanamo Bay tribunals. The authors write, "after querying the 516 CSRT unclassified summaries, the CTC found that 73% of the unclassified summaries meet the CTC’s highest threshold of a ‘demonstrated threat’ as an enemy combatant."
  

• "Stealing Al-Qa'ida's Playbook", February 2006. The authors explain, "in a sense, members of the jihadi movement have put their team’s playbooks online. By mining these texts for their tactical and strategic insights, the United States will be able to craft effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to defeat followers of the movement. In what follows, we will demonstrate the efficacy of this approach by highlighting the insights we have gleaned from the works of four prominent jihadi ideologues."
   
• "Militant Ideology Atlas", November 2006. Retired General Wayne Downing writes in the foreword, "this report...is the first systematic mapping of the ideology driving the actions of the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks and other violent actions around the world. Using a robust research methodology and critical analyses of the Jihadis’ most widely read texts, the Atlas gives us a highly nuanced map of the major thinkers in the Jihadi Movement and their most salient areas of consensus and disagreement. In short, this report identifies who the most influential people are among the Jihadi thinking class, what they are thinking, and where the movement is most vulnerable ideologically."
  

• "The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda", November 2006. The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point writes, "the Internet is a critical means of communication for the newest generation of terrorist groups.  The salafi jihadi movement in particular has used the Internet to pass strategic, operational, and tactical instruction to its followers, becoming adept at utilizing the anonymity and global reach of online communications to promote its message.  Visual imagery provides a key aspect of the terrorists’ message in that it allows these groups to paint a picture of their objectives, their enemies, and their strategy through graphics, photographs, and symbols.  The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has provided an open source catalogue of these images and their meaning."
  

• "Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa". "Based on a collection of al-Qa'ida documents recently released from the Department of Defense's Harmony Database, this report provides an analysis of al-Qa'ida's early operations in the Horn of Africa. These documents, captured in the course of operations supporting the Global War on Terror, have never before been available to the academic and policy community. Al-Qa'ida's (mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa includes a theoretically informed analysis of al-Qa'ida's successes and failures while operating in Somalia between 1992 and 1994. Case studies on Somalia and Kenya provide a historical and current analysis of al-Qa'ida's operations in the Horn. Our theoretical analysis and case studies inform policy recommendations on how the U.S. and its coalition partners might address the threat of terrorism in failed and weak states within the Horn of Africa and globally."
  

• "Executive Order - Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities", January 2009. In this Executive Order, President Obama ordered that "The detention facilities at Guantánamo for individuals covered by this order...be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than 1 year from the date of this order. If any individuals covered by this order remain in detention at Guantánamo at the time of closure of those detention facilities, they shall be returned to their home country, released, transferred to a third country, or transferred to another United States detention facility in a manner consistent with law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States."
  

• "Executive Order - Review of Detention Policy Options", January 2009. In this Executive Order, President Obama created "a Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition...to identify lawful options for the disposition of individuals captured or apprehended in connection with armed conflicts and counterterrorism operations." Members include the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  

• "Executive Order - Ensuring Lawful Interrogations", January 2009. This Executive Order states, "Executive Order 13440 of July 20, 2007, is revoked. All executive directives, orders, and regulations inconsistent with this order, including but not limited to those issued to or by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from September 11, 2001, to January 20, 2009, concerning detention or the interrogation of detained individuals, are revoked to the extent of their inconsistency with this order. Heads of departments and agencies shall take all necessary steps to ensure that all directives, orders, and regulations of their respective departments or agencies are consistent with this order." Further, "The CIA shall close as expeditiously as possible any detention facilities that it currently operates and shall not operate any such detention facility in the future."

• "National Strategy for Homeland Security", October 2007. According to this White House document, "the United States will use all instruments of national power and influence – diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement – to achieve our goals to prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; protect the American people, critical infrastructure, and key resources; and respond to and recover from incidents that do occur."

• "National Strategy for Aviation Security", March 2007. This document notes that "three broad principles provide overarching guidance to the Strategy, its objectives, and its actions. First, the Nation must use the full range of its assets and capabilities to prevent the Air Domain from being exploited by terrorist groups, hostile nation-states, and criminals to commit acts against the United States, its people, its infrastructure, and its other interests. Second, the Nation must ensure the safe and efficient use of the Air Domain. Third, the Nation must continue to facilitate travel and commerce."
  

• "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism", September 2006. According to this document, "the United States will continue to lead an expansive international effort in pursuit of a two-pronged vision: The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our way of life as a free and open society; and the creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them."
  

• "Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges", September 2006. This report states, "we have done much to degrade al-Qaida and its affiliates and to undercut the perceived legitimacy of terrorism. Our Muslim partners are speaking out against those who seek to use their religion to justify violence and a totalitarian vision of the world. We have significantly expanded our counterterrorism Coalition, transforming old adversaries into new and vital partners in the War on Terror. In addition, we have transformed our governmental institutions and framework to wage a long-term struggle...We have serious challenges ahead, including defeating the enemy, denying safehaven, combating the violent extremist ideology, protecting the homeland, securing WMD, and building partnership capacity. We must continue to strengthen and adapt our strategy and capabilities over the long term."
  

• "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", March 2006. Two pillars guide this strategy: "The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice, and human dignity...The second pillar...is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing community of democracies."
  

• "National Strategy for Maritime Security", September 2005. There are "three broad principles [that] provide overarching guidance to this Strategy. First, preserving the freedom of the seas...Second, the United States Government must facilitate and defend commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping...Third, the United States Government must facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our borders, while screening out dangerous people and material." 
  

• "National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction", December 2002. This strategy has three main pillars: 1) Counterproliferation to combat WMD use; 2) Strengthened nonproliferation to combat WMD proliferation; 3) Consequence management to respond to WMD use.
  

• "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America", September 2002. According to this document, "the aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity."
  

• "Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation". This document lays out a number of 2003 budget initiatives, including supporting first responders, defending against bioterrorism, and securing the borders. Other budget priorities include transportation security and protection of critical infrastructure.
  

• "Executive Order 12947: Prohibiting Transactions with Terrorists who Threaten to Disrupt the Middle East Peace Process". This 1995 order designated a number of organizations as terrorists that "threaten to disrupt the Middle East peace process," including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi Faction. 
  

• Initial Report, September 1996. In this report, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, chaired by Vice President Al Gore, recommended "twenty specific actions that provide near-term improvements in aviation security."
  

• Final Report, February 1997. Addressing aviation security, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security reported that it "believes that the threat against civil aviation is changing and growing, and that the federal government must lead the fight against it. The Commission recommends that the federal government commit greater resources to improving aviation security, and work more cooperatively with the private sector and local authorities in carrying out security responsibilities."